THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL LEGITIMACY by LI QINGYI



















A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 









I would like to thank everyone whom I have had the pleasure to come in contact 
with: family, friends, professors, teachers, and mere strangers who have left a 
mark on my life in one way or another. This thesis will not be the way it is today 
without any of you. 



























Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... 3 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................. 4 
Summary ........................................................................................................... 5 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 6 
2. The Context ................................................................................................ 12 
3. Neutrality under the microscope .............................................................. 20 
3.1 Dworkin and Kymlicka’s ethical neutrality  .......................................... 21 
3.1.1 First horn of the dilemma ................................................................ 27 
3.1.2 Second horn of the dilemma ............................................................ 30 
3.2 Rawls’s non-ethical neutrality ................................................................ 33 
3.2.1 Criticisms against Rawls ................................................................. 39 
4. The fundamental requirement of justice  ................................................ 49 
4.1 The concept of justice ............................................................................ 49 
4.2 End(s)-seekers ........................................................................................ 53 
4.3 Possible criticisms  ................................................................................. 61 
4.3.1 Some people are not moral equals? ................................................. 61 
4.3.2 Proving too much: non-interference from murder and rape? .......... 63 
4.3.3 Why stop at non-interference? ......................................................... 64 
4.4 Implications of the fundamental requirement of justice  ........................ 66 
4.4.1 The liberal principle of legitimacy and the fundamental requirement 
of justice does not require the prohibition of perfectionist policies ......... 66 
4.4.2 The fundamental requirement of justice requires the freedom of 
movement ................................................................................................. 70 
4.4.3 The end state .................................................................................... 75 
4.5 Appeal of the theory  .............................................................................. 78 
4.6 Closing remarks  ..................................................................................... 82 








The liberal principle of legitimacy underpins most liberal neutralist arguments 
against state perfectionism. It is no exaggeration to say that the case for 
neutrality turns on the conjunction of the principle and the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. However, this principle of legitimacy is often assumed and 
unjustified. In this thesis, I contribute to the debate by providing a moral 
foundation for the liberal principle of legitimacy – that end(s)-seekers have a 
right to non-interference. Having done so, I then argue that a proper 
understanding of the liberal principle of legitimacy (and its moral foundations) 
does not lead to a rejection of state perfectionism. We are instead directed by 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
Political philosophers have grappled with the following question: what 
should the state do and what makes state coercion legitimate? Can state coercion 
be legitimized at all? Contemporary discussion on the subject has taken a 
particular shape, in the form of a debate between two camps: the perfectionists 
and the liberal neutralists. 
One possible response, preferred by a group of philosophers called the political 
perfectionists, is as such: the state should help promote objectively valuable 
conceptions of the good.1  In other words, state policies and constitutions are 
justified, and hence legitimate if it allows citizens to realize the value that has 
been identified by the true theory of the good. On the other hand, neutralists 
believe that we have a strong case against legislation of perfectionist policies. 
They (neutralists) argue that the state should be neutral with regard to differing 
conceptions of the good in its justification of the constitution and/or state 
policies. Neutralists of different stripes argue for this claim in different ways. 
Some (I call them the non-ethical neutralists) argue that perfectionist policies 
run afoul of the liberal principle of legitimacy, which states that policies and 
constitutions are legitimate only when these policies are justified on terms that 
may be reasonably endorsed by the citizens. Others (let’s call them ethical 
neutralists) argue that perfectionist policies are counter-productive: even if the 
state actions are judged with reference to how they help citizens lead objectively 
                                                          
1 Some argue that the state should also ban or discourage disvaluable ways of life. For 
detailed discussions on perfectionism, see: 
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 




good lives, perfectionist policies run counter to certain liberal values (e.g. 
autonomy) that are necessary for the good life. 
I contribute to this debate by arguing first that the liberal principle of legitimacy 
that many theories of state neutrality depend on has to be justified with reference 
to certain moral foundations. Second, I will put forward my version of this moral 
foundation, the claim that all end(s)-seekers have an equal right to non-
interference from others. This moral principle, as I will argue later, is required 
by justice. Last, and linking the preceding arguments back to the debate between 
neutrality and perfectionism, I argue that the liberal principle of legitimacy does 
not require state neutrality. What it requires is toleration on the global level 
manifested by the respect of the right of individuals to move and form 
associations without the interference from other groups. Once this background 
condition has been guaranteed, there is no moral prohibition against the 
legislation of perfectionist rules within individual groups. 
Roadmap 
The argument for the claims above will be made by way of several 
chapters: 
In the chapter that follows, I give a broad overview of the debate between 
political perfectionism and political neutrality and the definitions of the key 
terms used.  
I then turn to the key arguments against state neutrality in chapter three. My aim 
is not to give a definitive verdict against theories espousing state neutrality.2 
                                                          
2 Some philosophers seem to think that all liberal neutrality require is an autopsy. See: 
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Instead, I hope to achieve a distillation, from the criticisms surfaced, of a set of 
necessary conditions that has to be fulfilled by theories purporting to supply an 
answer to this debate. 
I first argue that ethical neutralists are faced with the following dilemma: either 
they give up on neutralism and make the turn towards perfectionism (due to 
their theory’s’ inability to exclude perfectionist policies), or they maintain their 
stance on neutralism by appealing to the liberal principle of legitimacy but end 
up giving up on their ethical foundations (due to the inconsistency of affirming 
both the liberal principle of legitimacy and their ethical foundations).  This 
discussion highlights an important condition that has to be fulfilled in the 
neutrality project: the justification for state neutrality has to be thin enough to 
meet the requirement of the liberal principle of legitimacy as well.  
Having established the need for a basis for state neutrality that meets the liberal 
principle of legitimacy, we turn to Rawls’s attempt to provide such a basis in 
the form of the public political culture. I will argue that Rawls’s use of the public 
political culture does not achieve its purported aim of giving a neutral 
justification for state neutrality. I argue next that Rawls’s appeal to the public 
political culture is redundant.  It is unclear if it is necessary for us to appeal to 
the public political culture to achieve Rawls’s purported aims, i.e. (i) fulfil the 
requirements of the liberal principle of legitimacy and (ii) have stability for the 
right reasons. It seems like what is needed is a theory, ethical, moral or 
otherwise, that is thin enough to be the subject of endorsement.3 
                                                          
Richard Arneson, "Liberal Neutrality on the Good:  An Autopsy," in Perfectionism and 
Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory, ed. George Klosko and Steven Wall(United States of 
America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 
3 Or Rawls’s criterion of the overlapping consensus. 
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The point to take-away from this section is that a moral foundation is both 
desirable and essential for a convincing theory of political morality. Neutral 
justification of the Rawlsian kind, i.e. based on the public political culture, is 
unable to meet this particular criterion. Assuming that the afore-mentioned 
arguments are sound, the following represents the criteria that any political 
theory has to meet: 
(1) Political philosophy has to be done from the ground up. There is no escape 
from providing justification for the conception of legitimacy that is to be 
employed by specific theories 
(2) If a theory purports to be a theory on state neutrality, and is itself based on 
controversial premises, then it has to meet the asymmetry objection.4 
This leads us to a potential conundrum: given that we need a justification for 
the liberal principle of legitimacy, and that this justification cannot itself be 
based on premises that are subjected to reasonable disagreement, how then are 
we supposed to proceed? 
To answer these questions, I put forth my theory of political morality in chapter 
four. I attempt to establish the claim that we are required by justice to respect 
the rights of end(s)-seekers to non-interference. After which, I will attempt to 
show that the fundamental requirement of justice provides the much needed 
justification for the liberal principle of legitimacy. Assuming that the demands 
of justice exert itself equally on both individuals and the state, it follows that 
                                                          
4 The asymmetry objection states that the argument from reasonable disagreement about 
the good has to apply equally on both the conceptions of the good and conceptions of 
justice. For a treatment of the issue, see: 
Jonathan Quong, "Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy," Politics, Philosophy & 
Economic 4, no. 3 (2005). 
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the state has a prima facie obligation to not coerce its citizens without 
justification. Given that this account does not suffer from the disadvantages 
suffered by neutrality theories in the previous chapter, I look to show that my 
account is the most preferable account to date, or at the very least, preferable as 
compared to the most prominent theories advanced by Rawls, Dworkin, and 
Kymlicka. 
In the same chapter, I will also argue that in principle, the liberal principle of 
legitimacy does not rule out perfectionism but is compatible with it. When we 
purport to be neutral, we should not be neutral between conceptions of the good 
but between persons. Should a population converge on one perfectionist policy, 
then neutrality with respect to citizens does not preclude the implementation of 
policies based on the ethical conception they all agree on.  
There is another, more interesting implication that arises from the fundamental 
requirement of justice. That is, states (or communities, if one is an anarchist) 
that offer the freedoms of movement and association to people (not just their 
citizens) can fulfill the liberal principle of legitimacy and the fundamental 
requirement of justice just as well even if they are extremely perfectionistic. 
This means that the non-ethical neutralists are wrong about the implications of 
the liberal principle of legitimacy, and also that it may sometimes be desirable 
to eschew closed society theorizing. 
I will then conclude this chapter by highlighting the appeal of my theory over 
the other theories within the literature. Juxtaposing my theory against that of 
Rawls and perfectionist theories based on controversial values5, I will argue that 
                                                          
5 Not just controversial, but rarely justified. 
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the main appeal of my theory is its broader justificatory base due to my 
employment of premises that are thin enough to be accepted by persons of 
different philosophical stripes. Even if my arguments do not end up establishing 
the conclusions that I have sought to prove, I consider it a partial success if they 




Chapter 2: The Context 
Perfectionism 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the perfectionists believe that the 
state should help promote objectively valuable conceptions of the good. It is 
important that we distinguish two forms of perfectionism before we proceed. A 
perfectionist may be an ethical perfectionist or a political perfectionist. An 
ethical perfectionist is someone who believes that there are objective standards 
by which we can evaluate a person’s life, and that a person’s life is made good 
by the extent to which her life (or her living) measures up to those standards. 
One example of a perfectionist theory is Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Someone has 
lived a good life to the extent that she manages to live a life of virtue, while at 
the same time properly exercising her practical reason in philosophy and 
political life.6 
On the other hand, a political perfectionist makes the further claim that as far as 
possible, the state should help its citizens live up to those standards which make 
their lives objectively better. In other words, state policies and constitutions are 
justified with reference to the value identified by the true theory of the good.7 
More specifically, the state should enact policies so that citizens lead valuable 
lives. 8  We get an example of political perfectionism as we move from 
                                                          
6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
7 As we can see from the definitions given so far, while a political perfectionist is almost 
always an ethical perfectionist, an ethical perfectionist is not necessarily a political 
perfectionist, especially on the policy level. As we would see later, there are some 
philosophers who base their arguments for neutrality upon certain views of the good life. Let 
us call them ethical neutralists, and we will get to them shortly. 
8 George Klosko and Steven Wall, "Introduction," in Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in 
Liberal Theory, ed. George Klosko and Steven Wall(United States of America: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 
13 
 
Aristotle’s ethical perfectionism to his political views: the best state, according 
to Aristotle, is the one that is constituted in such a way that allows the citizens 
to live a good life by exercising their practical reason via political participation.9 
This led Aristotle to argue for a state where citizens get to rule and be ruled in 
turn, thereby ensuring that all citizens get to exercise their practical reason. 
Moving from the constitution to specific policies, a perfectionist who believes 
that knowledge is objectively good might argue for the state to provide 
education (or education vouchers) for its citizens.10  
Political perfectionism seems highly appealing to people holding common sense 
views about politics. What else is the state to do, other than to ensure that its 
citizens lead a good life? Joseph Chan describes political perfectionism as “not 
only the standard but natural view”. If people care about having an ethically 
good life, and if the state is supposed to help citizens pursue their vital interests, 
then it naturally follows that state institutions should be arranged to help citizens 
pursue their interest in living well.11 Even if there exist people who disagree 
with the objectively correct view, they do have an overriding desire to correct 
their erroneous views and choices.12 The fact that the state constitution and 
policies enable people to lead objectively better lives legitimatizes those very 
constitution and policies. 
 
                                                          
9 Aristotle, Politics, trans. C.D.C. Reeve(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998). 
10 This is assuming that provision of state education is the best means towards increasing the 
knowledge of citizens. 
11 Jospeh Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29, 
no. 1 (2000): 5-6. 




 Non-ethical neutralists disagree by arguing that the legitimacy of state 
action is not (solely) determined by the extent to which the state is able to help 
citizens lead good or better lives. While it might be the case that state A is more 
desirable than state B if A’s citizens lead vastly better lives (all else remaining 
constant), these neutralists argue that the perfectionist conception of state 
legitimacy is lacking. One necessary condition that the state has to fulfil is the 
liberal principle of legitimacy, which, according to Rawls, is as follows:  
“Our exercise of political power is fully proper [or legitimate] only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason”.13 
The arguments in this paper do not depend on this particular statement of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy. You will find a more general statement of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy below. In addition (and contra Rawls), I will 
expand the scope of the principle to include both state policies and constitutional 
essentials. 14  Let us briefly examine the implications entailed by the 
endorsement the liberal principle of legitimacy in the next few paragraphs. The 
liberal principle of legitimacy is usually combined with another premise, that of 
reasonable pluralism,15 to yield the conclusion that the liberal state has to be 
neutral with respect to the various conceptions of good held by the citizens. To 
                                                          
13 John Rawls, Political Liberalism(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 137. 
14 For more a more detailed justification of this assumption, see: 
Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
Chapter 7. 
15 More on this shortly. 
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do otherwise will be to wield illegitimate power over its citizens. Here’s a 
general version of the argument commonly stated by non-ethical neutralists: 
P1:  Any instance of state coercion and/or its justification is legitimate only 
if citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse them in light of beliefs 
acceptable to their common human reason.16 
P2:  In a societies characterized by reasonable pluralism, it is impossible for 
all citizens to endorse constitutional essentials and exercises of political 
power based on a particular conception of the good.   
C:  Therefore, any instance of state coercion (or its justification) that is 
based on a particular conception of the good is not legitimate. (P1, P2)17 
(P1) is a statement on how a particular policy may satisfy the liberal principle 
of legitimacy. (P2) states what Rawls calls the fact of reasonable pluralism, the 
view that “the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found 
in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon 
pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy.”18 This 
means that different views of life (and conceptions of the good) necessarily exist 
in a state that guarantees the freedom of inquiry. This is because people arrive 
at different conclusions based on their viewing the world in lenses borne out of 
                                                          
16 This premise may be stated in varying strength. It may refer to people as they are, or a 
certain idealized group like the Rawlsian reasonable peoples. This distinction is however, not 
that important for our purposes here. For more discussion on the subject, see:  
Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, Chapter 7., and 
Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
17 For different ways in which this argument may be stated, see 
 Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz(Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), 315-6. and Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
For Simon Caney’s criticisms of Nagel’s view, see: 
Simon Caney, "Thomas Nagel's Defence of Liberal Neutrality," Analysis 52, no. 1 (1992). 
18 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly(Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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their varying personal histories. Assuming that reasonable pluralism must 
always obtain when people freely exercise their reasoning capacities, a state 
acting on one particular conception of good can never fulfill the condition stated 
in (P1). Ergo, the state should be neutral; it should not justify the constitution 
or state policies based on a conception of the good that certain citizens may 
reasonably reject. We have now arrived at the crux of the debate: owing to their 
endorsement of the liberal principle of legitimacy, non-ethical neutralists argue 
that the state should always be neutral with respect to the conceptions of the 
good held by its citizens, while the political perfectionists argue that it is 
legitimate (and desirable) for the state to order its constitution and enact policies 
that help citizens live more ethical lives. Some political perfectionists (e.g. Raz) 
deny P1 by arguing for a different conception of legitimacy (P1)19, while others 
(e.g. Joseph Chan and Simon Caney) deny P2 by noting how perfectionist 
policies may still be legitimate under the demands of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy.20  
There is another group of neutralist philosophers (e.g. Ronald Dworkin and Will 
Kymlicka) who share the neutralist conclusion that the state should be neutral 
towards conceptions of the good, but do not explicitly endorse, or make use of, 
the liberal principle of legitimacy in their arguments. Being ethical 
perfectionists, they have their own (thin) conception of what is necessary for a 
good life. Their conclusion that the state should be neutral with regard to 
different conceptions of the good is borne from certain (liberal) elements of their 
ethical conception. For instance, one might argue that it is impossible to make 
                                                          
19 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 53. 




the ethical lives of its citizens better via the coercive instruments of the state, 
given that ethical flourishing requires an inward endorsement from the citizens 
themselves. Inward endorsement is a necessary condition for a practice to add 
value to an individual’s life, and coercion, which compels outward conformity, 
can never help citizens lead valuable lives. As such, the state should not legislate 
based on conceptions of the good even if the perfectionist is right in claiming 
that “the right-making characteristic of state actions is the promotion of 
objectively good lives.”21 For the purposes of differentiating these philosophers 
from the political perfectionists and the liberal neutralists, I will refer to this 
brand of theory as ethical neutrality, and the theorists as ethical neutralists. 
One can then locate the site of debate between each of the theories in the 
following way: neutralism stands in opposition to political perfectionism given 
that the key idea of any neutralist argument is the claim that “the state should 
not favour or take sides between different citizens’ “moral, religious, and 
philosophical views”.22 Neutralists themselves also differ with respect to how 
the commitment to neutrality may be justified.  
What’s the big deal? 
Should the neutralists win this debate, it will mean that states and 
citizens should not appeal to the fact that ‘the act is disvaluable based on a 
certain conception of the good’ when they seek to prohibit certain actions via 
the instrument of the state. It is also likely that many options should, as 
demanded by the neutralist political morality, be swept off the legislative 
                                                          
21 Thomas Hurka, "Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality," The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 3, no. 1 (1995): 38. 
22 Klosko and Wall, "Introduction," 6. 
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agenda, given the amount legislations that are justified with reference to the 
good (of the individual or of the society). 
On the other hand, should the political perfectionists prevail, then there is 
nothing wrong with the idea that the political arena is also an arena for citizens 
to jostle for their own conceptions of the good to take centre place. Laws enacted 
based on its propensity to promote certain valuable forms of life are both 
legitimate and desirable. 
I hope that I have, in a few broad strokes, illustrated the appeal and problems 
facing each of these theories, as well as the implications of this debate on the 
political issues of our time. Before we turn to the next chapter for the arguments, 
allow me to make some clarifications with regard to some of the key terms used 
in this essay.  
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy, as it is being used in this essay, refers to a certain standard 
that state action has to meet before we deem that action permissible. And given 
that most state actions are coercive, or are backed by prior acts (or threats) of 
coercion, the concept of legitimacy also accounts for the conditions under which 
we have a duty to obey these coercive rules. A legitimate state is therefore one 
that has justifiable authority over us. By extension, a legitimate state policy is 
one that we have a duty to obey. 
Ethics vs. Morality 
It is also useful here for us to make the distinction between ethics and 
morality as it is used in this essay. When I use the term ethics, I refer to views 
regarding conceptions of the good (life) and bad (life). Morality, on the other 
19 
 
hand, is reserved for views about views about the right and wrong, more 
specifically views on how we ought to treat each other.23 For the purposes of 
this essay, the terms ethics and conceptions of the good will be used 
interchangeably. 
  
                                                          
23 Ronald Dworkin makes such a distinction in Ronald Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 13. Gerald Gaus makes a 
distinction between social morality and the other parts of ethics in Gerald Gaus, The Order of 
Public Reason(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2-3. 
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Chapter 3: Neutrality under the microscope 
Having defined the relevant concepts that will be employed in this essay, 
we now turn our attention to the two types of neutrality theories mentioned in 
the preceding chapter. The two theories share the view that the state ought to be 
neutral with respect to the citizens’ differing conceptions of the good, but arrive 
at this conclusion by way of different premises. In this chapter, I begin by 
examining ethical neutrality and then Rawls’s non-ethical neutrality in turn. The 
goal of this treatment is to see where each of these theories fall short, paving 
way for a set of criteria that my positive theory will meet in the next chapter. 
There are two important things to keep in mind before we proceed. First, and as 
afore-mentioned, this chapter is not meant to give a knock-down argument 
against all forms of neutrality theories. My aim here is less ambitious. What I 
look to do is to surface certain criticisms that I believe give neutrality theories 
most trouble, consolidate a list of criteria that philosophical theories on this 
subject have to meet, and then argue that my theory is better by virtue of it being 
better able to meet those criteria (and more). 
Second, the fact that I only entertain the arguments of Dworkin, Kymlicka, and 
Rawls in this section should not be seen as a defect. I chose to engage with the 
arguments of Dworkin, Kymlicka because they are the forerunners within the 
camp they occupy, but one might question if my criticisms apply to all theories 
within those camps. I believe that there is little reason to think otherwise, for 
the criticisms offered in this chapter (as you would see later) are targeted at a 
generalized form of the ethical neutralist argument, with the more specific tenets 
of Dworkin and Kymlicka’s theories used as examples to fill out what is meant 
21 
 
with each premise. As such, I see no reason for worries on this count. In Rawls’s 
case, his theory is, to my knowledge, the only one that makes use of the concept 
of the public political culture to justify neutrality without making reference to 
any other moral or ethical foundations.24 Even if my arguments fail to apply to 
all theories of neutrality, there is little reason to fret as long as we manage to 
arrive at the list of criteria mentioned above. 
3.1 Dworkin and Kymlicka’s ethical neutrality 
As the name suggests, ethical neutralism is characterized by its commitment to 
(i) a certain (commonly liberal) view of the good life, and (ii) the view that the 
state should remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good. 
The argument made by ethical neutralists usually take this particular form: 
P1: A necessary condition for living well (the good life) is the realization of the 
liberal value (e.g. autonomy or ethical integrity) in one’s life. 
P2: State action based on perfectionist reasons necessarily runs counter to the 
liberal value in question. 
C: Therefore, the liberal state has to be neutral with regards to the good for 
perfectionist reasons.25 
I will explain each of this premises with reference to the theories put forth by 
two of the most prominent ethical neutralists in the literature: Ronald Dworkin 
                                                          
24 Charles Larmore, for example shares much of Rawls’s views but argues that political 
neutrality is justified on the moral foundation that citizens are ‘free and equal’. Interestingly 
though, he does not think that he is able to provide any such reason for thinking why that is 
the case. See: Charles Larmore, "The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism," The Journal of 
Philosophy 96, no. 12 (1999). 
25 For more specific versions of this argument, see: Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002), 237-84. And Will Kymlicka, 




and Will Kymlicka. We will begin with the ethical foundations of ethical 
neutrality. 
Dworkin’s ethical neutralism centres on two key ideas: the challenge model of 
ethics, and the idea of ethical integrity. We will go over each in turn. According 
to Dworkin’s challenge model of ethics, the “the goodness of a good life lies in 
its inherent value as a performance.”26 He contrasts this view of ethics with the 
model of impact, which measures the value of one’s life solely in terms of the 
amount of objective value, or ‘impact’, created during the course of one’s life. 
The latter view closely resembles hedonistic conceptions of the good life. 
Assuming that pleasure is the sole objective value, the most impactful, and thus 
valuable life, will be the one which creates the highest amount of pleasure. 
Under a non-hedonistic impact view, we can explain the value of Martin Luther 
King’s life by his contributions in combating racism and segregation in the 
United States.  
Dworkin disagrees that the model of impact is the right theory of value and the 
good life. Rather, the goodness of a life should be measured in terms of its 
performative value rather than (simply in terms of) its impact. Dworkin uses the 
example of a majestic dive to illustrate the challenge model of ethics. The value 
of our lives is much like the skilful achievement of a majestic dive: the 
accomplishment in itself is valuable, even if there was no lasting impact made 
in the world as the ripples dissipates.27 The best sort of life is the kind where the 
individual skilfully negotiates the challenges present within her life.  
                                                          




The value at work within this model is objective. Certain ways of meeting the 
challenges in life are objectively better or worse than others. All else remaining 
equal, a sportsman who became a world champion via hard work has had a 
greater achievement, hence better life than another who engaged in doping. 
However, the realization of certain values (or the meeting of certain challenges) 
in one’s life is not the end all and be all. Another necessary condition has to be 
met: that of ethical integrity. Dworkin suggests that a life cannot be better 
without the inward endorsement from the individual in question. In his own 
words, “my life cannot be better for me in virtue of some feature or component 
I think has no value”.28 Should the afore-mentioned sportsman see no value in 
the challenge of scaling the heights of the sporting world, then his 
accomplishment, no matter how acclaimed, cannot add any value to his life. The 
reason for Dworkin’s aversion to political perfectionism is clearer at this point: 
pace (P1), ethical integrity is necessary and vital for the good life.  
Kymlicka’s argument for state neutrality takes on a similar structure. The 
necessary condition invoked by Kymlicka is endorsement, which is derived 
from the value of autonomy. According to Kymlicka, a person’s life can be 
valuable only if the person leads the life according to her own beliefs about 
value.29 Call this the endorsement constaint. Like Dworkin, Kymlicka believes 
that a life cannot be made better simply via outward conformity to worthy 
pursuits. As such, we can say that the relationship between the endorsement and 
the good life is similar to that between ethical integrity and the good life: 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 268. 
29 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 203-4. 
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endorsement and ethical integrity are necessary for the good life for Kymlicka 
and Dworkin respectively. 
Before we move on to P2, we should revisit and keep in mind the key similarity 
between the ethical neutralist and the political perfectionist. Both camps share 
the commitment to the view that there are objectively better or worse ways of 
life, but they differ with respect to whether state perfectionism on the policy 
level is able to help people achieve objectively better lives. And this difference 
is exemplified in P2 of the ethical neutralist argument. 
So let us now turn to P2 of the ethical neutralist argument. According to 
Dworkin and Kymlicka, the use of state instruments cannot make citizens lead 
better lives. The most common instruments used by the state are coercive. A 
state may choose to ban certain undesirable ways of life, or mandate that citizens 
act in accordance to the true religion. These bans and mandates are often backed 
up with the use of coercive force, first with the levy of fines, and then the threat 
of imprisonment should the fines be left unpaid. Should the transgressors ignore 
the summons of the court, police action is taken against her. While the use of 
such coercive force may direct the citizens toward valuable activities, they do 
not satisfy the necessary criteria of ethical integrity and/or autonomy. Take the 
following case for example:  
Suppose that the state has the means to know which occupation is most suitable 
for each individual, and allocates each individual the job that best suits her 
abilities. This allocation will allow each citizen to lead lives according to the 
ways of life that is the most suitable for them. On top of that, the state prohibits 
its citizens from engaging in any acts that are deemed to be ethically undesirable, 
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thereby stopping the citizens from engaging in any acts that will create disvalue 
in their lives. 
On conceptions of the good that does not see ethical integrity or endorsement 
as a necessary condition for the good life, the actions of the state here seems to 
generate the best possible life for the citizens. For example, under the view of 
the impact view of ethics, such actions make perfect sense as the citizens were 
given the best possible jobs for them to make the greatest impact, while being 
steered away from frivolous and disvaluable pursuits. 
On the other hand, ethical neutralists argue that all the state is doing here is 
compelling outward conformity to certain ways of life, and that this conformity 
neither guarantee nor encourage inward endorsement of those ways of life that 
were allocated to the citizens. In fact, one can plausibly assume (according to 
the ethical neutralists) that the citizens will come to resent the forced 
compliance mandated by the state.  
A variant of this argument is acknowledged by the perfectionist Joseph Raz, 
who sees autonomy as necessary condition for a good life.30 According to Raz, 
coercive paternalism, even if it is implemented for the sake of the citizens, 
cannot make them lead better lives. Let us suppose that philosophy is a vice, 
and one’s life ends up being worse off when one philosophizes. Should the state 
seek to prevent citizens from engaging in philosophy, the state will have to 
back-up its directives with the threat of coercion, i.e. fines and ultimately 
imprisonment. This punishment however, detracts more from the one’s well-
                                                          
30 Autonomy here is defined as the self-authorship of one’s own life. For Raz, one is 
autonomous to the extent that one has the capacities to choose from an adequate set of 
non-trivial options. See: Raz, The Morality of Freedom. 
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being than the activity that it is supposed to prevent. Putting someone in prison 
does not simply prevent one from engaging in the vice. It also prevents the 
individual from engaging in any other worthy pursuit. Coercive punishments 
directed at making people choose only valuable pursuits is therefore 
counterproductive, and undermine one’s moral well-being more than the very 
activity it seeks to prohibit.31 
This is also reminiscent of an argument against coercive paternalism.32 We do 
not seek to punish people for failing to adhere to state prohibitions against 
smoking or unhealthy food because jailing these people for their inability to 
adhere to these guidelines represent a greater detriment to their welfare as 
compared to their consumption of these substances or food. The punishment by 
the state is therefore disproportionally worse than the disvalue that the 
punishment is supposed to prevent. Likewise, the perfectionist policies of the 
state takes the citizens further away from the good life that those policies were 
supposed to encouraged. Thus, taking P2 in conjunction with P1, we get the 
conclusion that the state ought not legislate based on perfectionist 
considerations. 
Something to note from the above-mentioned argument is that the ethical 
neutralists seldom appeal to any substantive conceptions of ethics. That is, they 
seldom talk about what kind of pursuits (e.g. philosophical, athletic, political, 
etc) are valuable. Rather, they appeal to necessary condition(s) that has to be 
met before a practice or pursuit is able to generate any value to a person’s life, 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 418. 
32 One who thinks that coercive paternalism is justified believes that the state may legislate 
coercive policies for the good of its citizens, even if the citizens do not wish to act accordance 
with what is dictated by those policies. 
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and that state action is counterproductive towards the attainment of the value. I 
will argue in the next section that this argumentative strategy does not allow the 
ethical neutralists to arrive at the conclusion that the state should not favour 
particular ethical conceptions; more specifically, P2 of the ethical neutralist 
argument is false. The weakness of P2 forces the ethical neutralist into dilemma: 
either they become perfectionists themselves, or they appeal to the liberal 
principle of legitimacy (to remain a neutralist) and see their own ethical 
foundations taken out of the justificatory picture for neutralism. I begin with the 
first horn of the dilemma in the next section. 
3.1.1 First horn of the dilemma 
I begin this section by arguing that P2 of the ethical neutralist argument is false, 
and that the ethical neutralists will have to be a perfectionist if they are to stay 
true to their ethical foundation. To do this, I will show in the subsequent 
paragraphs that the use of state instrument is not antithetical to the goal of 
making citizens lead better lives. This, as I will argue later, is true for both 
coercive and non-coercive state actions. I will begin with an analysis of coercive 
state action in the next paragraph. 
When Dworkin and Kymlicka argue that coercion is unable to make someone 
endorse an activity from the inside, they take only a short-term view of coercion 
and its effects. It may be granted that one might be pushed further away from 
the right conception of ethics when one is forced into practicing it. However, 
coercing someone into an ethically meaningful way of life might also make the 
person see the benefits of that way of life in the long term. Take the following 
case for example. Suppose that Christianity has been proven to be the one true 
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religion (or for a weaker variation of this scenario: that the majority of citizens 
in a certain state believe in Christianity), and that the precepts of Christianity 
offer the best guide to leading a good life. The perfectionist state then proceeds 
to mandate that all citizens become Christians, and at the same time ban the 
practice of all other religions. 
Kymlicka might be right about the pushback from the adherents of other 
religions in the short-term. However, he neglected to take into account the fact 
that pro-longed exposure to the religious teachings may make the citizens come 
to realize the worth of leading a life according to Jesus’ teachings. And if it is 
indeed possible for people to come to appreciate religious teachings after pro-
longed exposure, then the state would have done well to convert non-Christians 
to Christianity, especially when there is a low likelihood of these citizens 
converting to Christianity when they are left on their own. In this case, it is 
preferable for the state to take coercive actions rather than to leave the citizens 
to their own devices.33 
Suppose that we concede, for the sake of argument, that citizens can never be 
forced into leading a good life via state coercion. This concession does little for 
the ethical neutralist argument as it is still possible for the state to implement 
non-coercive state policies to make the lives of citizens better. Once again, the 
implementation of these non-coercive policies need and do not run afoul of the 
requirements of ethical integrity and the endorsement constraint. Let us take the 
following case for example. One way in which a state can raise the education 
level may be through the granting of vouchers to citizens so that schooling may 
                                                          
33 To be fair to Dworkin, he did take such cases into account. See Dworkin’s treatment in: 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, Chapter 6. 
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be subsidized for families which cannot afford to send children to school. Such 
a policy is non-coercive, and is usually made for perfectionist reasons, for it is 
often assumed that the more highly educated will go on to lead better lives.34 In 
fact, the granting of school vouchers is perfectly consistent with the challenge 
model of ethics and the endorsement constraint. Educated citizens usually have 
more options, and are also better able to make good choices amongst those 
options. Under the challenge model of ethics, higher education attainment can 
make the citizens better negotiators of the challenges ahead of them. While I 
acknowledge that the likes of Dworkin and Kymlicka do affirm the moral need 
for education subsidies, their arguments for education is not one that is based 
on perfectionist reasons.35 Assuming that no separate independent argument had 
been given by Dworkin and Kymlicka, it is unclear how Dworkin and Kymlicka 
can consistently maintain that the state subsidy of education for perfectionist 
reasons is counter-productive, thereby undermining their anti-perfectionist 
stance. Ruling out this sort of non-coercive political perfectionism requires 
something more – the neutrality project requires the liberal principle of 
legitimacy to even have a chance against the perfectionists. Recall that the 
ethical neutralists do not actively invoke the liberal principle of legitimacy in 
their arguments. Should they choose to invoke the liberal principle of legitimacy, 
they can then put forth the libertarian argument against perfectionist state 
subsidies. They can now claim that the state subsidies are possible only with 
taxation, and taxing people is only possible with (the threat of) coercion.  
                                                          
34 Or, for the libertarians, minimally coercive. 
35 Left-leaning liberals like Dworkin and Kymlicka will argue for education subsides (or 
subsidies for certain pursuits) based on concerns for distributive justice. 
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Should the ethical neutralists then endorse, and marshal the liberal principle of 
neutrality against the political perfectionists? Or should they admit that a more 
consistent interpretation of their theory leads to the conclusion that political 
perfectionism is permissible (and desirable)? The former option might seem 
more palatable on first sight, but I will argue in the next sub-section that the 
liberal principle of legitimacy is incompatible with the ethical foundations 
espoused by the ethical neutralists, and that a more consistent interpretation of 
their theory leads us to political perfectionism instead. 
3.1.2 Second horn of the dilemma 
Now, suppose that the ethical neutralist has incorporated the liberal principle of 
legitimacy into her overall justification for state neutrality. However, taking this 
route means eschewing the ethical foundations of their theory and moving into 
the camp of the non-ethical neutralists.  
Suppose a non-liberal perfectionist poses the following objection to P1 of the 
original ethical neutralist argument: can’t there be occasions where a certain 
value (or avoidance of disvalue) trumps the value of autonomy or ethical 
integrity? For example, can’t a life of homosexuality be so degrading, according 
to certain doctrines, that we should forcibly restrain a homosexual from living 
a homosexual lifestyle, even at the expense of his autonomy? If this objection 
is right, then it means that there can be occasions where perfectionistic policies 
may be implemented so that citizens may enjoy a higher level of well-being. In 
the example of homosexuality stated above, the state may implement laws 
banning homosexual lifestyle if it leads to an overall increase in the well-being 
of the citizens, even if it means that the lives of its citizens is less autonomous. 
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One possible reply here is to insist that the value of autonomy/ethical integrity 
is one that trumps all other values in society. No amount of other values may 
outweigh the liberal value in a trade-off. Given the necessity of the liberal value, 
the state should therefore seek to make sure that the value of individuality is 
protected by the state. It then follows from here that the liberal state should be 
neutral with respect to the conceptions of good held by its citizens because only 
the neutral state may succeed in safeguarding the value of autonomy/ethical 
integrity.36 
However, this reply does not seem to offer a way out for the ethical neutralists. 
The liberal principle of legitimacy excludes conceptions of the good from the 
legislative table because of the assumption that there is no conception of the 
good that is widely shared amongst all citizens in society. Recall also that 
according to the principle of liberal legitimacy, state policies must be reasonably 
endorsed by all citizens that they are addressed to. In the face of reasonable 
pluralism, autonomy/ethical integrity is just one value out of many, and there 
exist people who do not necessarily endorse the value of autonomy or the 
challenge model of ethics. In that case, to assert that autonomy or ethical 
integrity is the one value that trumps over all other values is to assert dominance 
over dissenting citizens, and to wield illegitimate authority over those citizens. 
Such a reply is therefore inconsistent with the kind of anti-perfectionist 
argument that is anchored by the principle of liberal legitimacy. By saying that 
the state should not endorse any perfectionist value apart from autonomy or 
ethical integrity, the ethical neutralist is uttering something that is 
indistinguishable from the utterance of the perfectionists that she is keen to 
                                                          
36 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 88. 
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criticize. If the ethical neutralists wish to employ the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, then they will have to point out the asymmetry between their own 
ethical foundations, and the conceptions of the good that they are keen to 
exclude from the legislative agenda; they will have to say how their ethical 
foundations satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy while the other 
conceptions of the good do not. 
One may point out that I am putting the ethical neutralist in a false dilemma: 
even if the appeal to autonomy permits state intervention based on perfectionist 
reasons (as per my argument in the previous section), it does not require that 
the state intervene on the basis of those reasons. Thus, the appeal to the liberal 
principle of legitimacy is consistent with ethical neutralism; the two are not 
mutually exclusive.37 
I am willing to accept the criticism, but this response (on the part of the ethical 
neutralist) comes at a heavy price for the ethical neutralists. This, of course, is 
in so far as the ethical neutralists wish for their ethical foundations to serve any 
justificatory role for state neutrality. For it is now the case that the justification 
for state neutrality is made solely with reference to the liberal principle of 
legitimacy rather than the ethical foundations (e.g. autonomy). And it therefore 
makes little sense for the theory to be labelled ‘ethical neutralism’, for the 
neutralist component of the theory has nothing to with the ethical foundations. 
They may still retain their belief in value of autonomy, but this belief remains a 
belief in the ethical sphere, and lends no support to the justification of state 
neutrality. 
                                                          
37 I thank an anonymous examiner for highlighting this. 
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As such, Dworkin and Kymlicka will have to make an unpalatable choice here: 
either they give up on their claims to being neutrality theorists, or they eschew 
their ethical foundations and move towards the camp of non-ethical neutrality. 
Now, let us suppose that the ethical neutralists pursue the latter option: they now 
opt for an argument for state neutrality that is devoid of ethical foundations, one 
that is based on the public political culture. Will they then do any better? I argue 
not, and we will see why in the next section. 
3.2 Rawls’s non-ethical neutrality38 
In this section, I will argue that Rawls’s attempt at giving a non-ethical 
justification for state neutrality via the public political culture fails. It fails 
because Rawls’s appeal to the public political culture is itself non-neutral and 
redundant. Most importantly, it is unable to offer a justification for the liberal 
principle of legitimacy which anchors his project and is itself subject to 
reasonable disagreement. 
To better understand Rawls’s project, I begin this section with the key question 
that Rawls’s project seeks to answer. This will help us to better understand 
Rawls’s methodological concerns, for the political turn of Rawls’s work is a 
direct response to this question. The question that Rawls sets out to answer is 
this: “how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society 
of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”.39 Rawls calls the 
                                                          
38 This treatment of Rawls is reproduced (with modifications) from my unpublished work in 
2014. See: Li Qingyi, "Political Liberalism and Comprehensive Liberalism,"(2014). 
39 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 34. 
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second part of the statement40 the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’. The aim of 
political liberalism is to articulate ways in which a stable society can exist and 
endure against the backdrop of reasonable pluralism.41 
One might ask of Rawls: why this particular aim, and why assume that 
reasonable pluralism will always obtain? I believe that there are two main 
reasons behind this. First, Rawls believes that one of the main tasks of political 
philosophy is to contribute to how people think of their political and social 
institutions as a whole. Here, Rawls is seeing himself as contributing towards 
the public discourse in his own country (the United States), to help citizens in 
his country make sense of their place within the system. Hence, we should 
understand Rawls as speaking to a specific group of people, i.e. his compatriots, 
in Political Liberalism.  
This brings us to the next reason, which is that the fact of reasonable pluralism 
is an inevitable outcome of the free exercise of human reason under free 
institutions. Given that the U.S. is a liberal-democratic state characterized by 
the existence of free institutions, the fact of reasonable pluralism will always 
obtain in such a state. Rawls bases this view on what he calls the burdens of 
judgment. The burdens of judgment are the “sources of disagreement between 
rational and reasonable people with respect to the comprehensive doctrines they 
affirm”.42 These sources of disagreement are: (i) the complexity in assessing the 
empirical evidence concerning different cases, (ii) vagueness of concepts 
                                                          
40 “Citizens divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines.” 
41 Do note, that it is also possible to ask the same question about the world rather than 
simply focusing our attention on the stability of one society. This is great implications for 
what is to come in the next chapter. 
42 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 35. 
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requiring the interpretation of individuals, and (iii) (vastly different) personal 
experiences, shaping the way in which (i) and (ii) are assessed by individuals.43 
Given these sources of disagreement, one cannot expect that every citizen in 
society accept one and the same comprehensive doctrine. As such (and as 
already mentioned), Rawls concludes that conceptions of justice in a democratic 
society cannot be justified with reference to one particular comprehensive 
doctrine. The conception of justice has to be political and freestanding. This 
means that for Rawls to contribute to the discourse in the state which he sees 
himself as a citizen of, the fact of reasonable pluralism becomes the focus of 
Rawls’s enquiry in Political Liberalism. 
Rawls proceeds from the fact of reasonable pluralism to argue that a conception 
of justice cannot be justified based on a single comprehensive doctrine44, given 
that (i) citizens in a democratic state affirm different reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines (fact of reasonable pluralism) and (ii) only the use of oppressive force 
may compel these citizens to affirm the same comprehensive doctrine. Rawls 
calls the latter statement the fact of oppression. Hence, he proffers an alternative 
conception of justice: a political conception which is freestanding with respect 
to all comprehensive doctrines. By political, he means that the conception of 
justice applies only to the basic structure45  of the society. By freestanding, 
Rawls means to say that the conception of justice is not derived from a 
                                                          
43 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 58. 
44 A comprehensive doctrine is one that hold for all kinds of subject ranging from conduct of 
individuals. Most comprehensive doctrines direct the individual towards certain modes of 
conduct and offers answers to the various metaphysical questions in this world. While Rawls 
uses the term comprehensive doctrines, we shall take Rawls to be addressing conceptions of 
good as well. 
45 Basic structure refers to the major political and social institutions of a liberal society: for 
example, the political constitution, and the legal system, the economy, the family etc. A 
conception of justice which applies only to the basic structure is differentiated from a 
comprehensive conception which applies to most, or all, aspects of a citizen’s life. 
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comprehensive doctrine applied to the basic structure as “the political values of 
justice… are not simply represented as moral requirement externally 
imposed”.46 In avoiding any sort of reliance on any particular comprehensive 
doctrine, the political conception sidesteps long standing conflicts over the true 
comprehensive doctrine and specifies fair terms of social cooperation that can 
be affirmed by all reasonable citizens. 
How then, can a conception of justice be freestanding with respect to all 
comprehensive doctrines (or conceptions of the good)? It is at this point that 
Rawls makes an appeal to the public political culture of the democratic state. 
According to Rawls, the public political culture comprises “the political 
institutions of a constitutional regime, and the public traditions of their 
interpretations, as well as historic texts and documents that are common 
knowledge.”47 A basic set of ideas and principles can be gleaned from the public 
political culture, and this set of ideas, according to Rawls, is implicitly 
recognized by citizens in that society. This basic set of ideas will then form the 
basic premises for the political conception of justice. Since the basic ideas are 
implicitly recognized by the citizens, it follows from here that the resulting 
political conception is a result of ideas that citizens themselves affirm. 
How then, is stability for the right reasons achieved? While Rawls did not wish 
for the political conception of justice to be derived from an antecedent 
comprehensive moral or religious doctrine, he maintains that the conception of 
justice that is being endorsed is a moral one. The moral character of the political 
conception of justice grants Rawls’s theory the stability he is looking for.  
                                                          
46 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 98. 
47 Ibid., 13-4. 
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The idea of overlapping consensus confers the moral character upon Rawls’s 
political conception of justice. Recall that the fundamental ideas of the public 
political culture yield a political conception of justice that is derived not from 
any single comprehensive doctrine. It is still an open question whether the 
reasonable would willingly affirm the political conception of justice, given that 
it could very well be the case that the political conception contradicts the tenets 
of the comprehensive doctrines that reasonable citizens hold. Given also that 
the reasonable comprehensive doctrines shape the moral views of their adopters, 
stability of the society cannot be achieved if the political conception of justice 
runs afoul of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society.  
Rawls understands this, and introduces the overlapping consensus as another 
necessary condition that has to be fulfilled if enduring stability is to be achieved 
in society. Here, Rawls makes the assumption that the liberal political 
conception of justice that was the product of the public political culture can also 
be endorsed by the various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that exist in a 
liberal society. Rawls calls this the overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  
How is this overlapping consensus possible? Rawls asserts that the political 
conception of justice is akin to a module that can fit and be rendered consistent 
with the tenets of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society.48 By this, he 
means that citizens have reasons to act in accordance with the dictates of the 
liberal political conception of justice, and these reasons can be found within the 
very reasonable comprehensive doctrines they endorse. It is important to note, 
                                                          
48 ———, Political Liberalism: 12, 145. 
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at this point, that the overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines represent 
neither a modus vivendi nor a compromise that is struck by various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. The claim Rawls makes is stronger: the affirmation 
of the liberal conception “rests on the totality of reasons specified within the 
comprehensive [moral] doctrine affirmed by each citizen”, even if each doctrine 
relates to the liberal conception in a different way.49 This makes the liberal 
conception of justice a moral conception as well, and is therefore able to 
generate enduring stability for the right reasons.  
To recapitulate, 
1. A conception of justice (a) has to be accepted without the use of 
oppressive means, and (b) be the focus of an overlapping consensus, to 
generate stability for the right reasons 
2. If reasonable pluralism is inevitable, then (a) and (b) are not possible for 
comprehensive doctrines. 
3. Reasonable pluralism is inevitable due to the burdens of judgment 
4. Comprehensive doctrines (liberalisms) will neither be the focus of an 
overlapping consensus nor be adopted throughout society without the 
use of oppressive means. (2, 3) 
5. Only a free standing (not derived from any comprehensive doctrine) 
political conception of justice can be accepted without oppressive means. 
6. The only way for a theory to be free standing is to be drawn from ideas 
implicit within the public political culture of a liberal society 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 170-1. 
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7. The only way to arrive at a conception of justice without oppressive 
means is to base the conception on ideas from the public political culture 
(5, 6) 
8. Rawls assumes that a political conception of justice based on the public 
political culture can be the subject of an overlapping consensus 
9. Only a political conception of justice based on the public political 
culture can generate stability for the right reasons (1,7,8) 
This concludes my exposition of Rawls’s theory, and I go on to offer my 
criticisms of Rawls’s theory in the next section. 
3.2.1 Criticisms against Rawls 
The first criticism I advance here pertains to the assumptions that Rawls 
makes about the public political culture. First, I argue that Rawls does not give 
sufficient justification for believing that the set of ideas he assumes is indeed 
the set that best represents the public political culture of a democratic society. 
Recall that the public political culture of the democratic society comprises the 
political institutions of a constitutional democracy, the interpretations of these 
institutions, court judgments, as well as the historic documents that detail these 
institutions.50 It is fair to say that every constitutional democracy in this world 
has got a fairly long history, and this long history is accompanied by a long list 
of constitution, court judgments, political texts and political proclamations. 
Rawls himself acknowledges this as he described the “public culture as not 
unambiguous [as] it contains a variety of possible organizing ideas that might 
                                                          
50 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13-14. 
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be used instead”.51 Hence, there is a need to justify why one assumes one set of 
ideas over any other set.  
I believe that there are two ways in which Rawls can seek justification for the 
fundamental ideas he assumes. The first of which is to study the political 
tradition of the society that he is located within, and give arguments for why he 
thinks the interpretation of the fundamental ideas he assumes accord with the 
political tradition of that society. Call this the sociological method. This is also 
the most direct way for one to arrive at a set of fundamental ideas which is 
freestanding. In the context of the United States, what Rawls could have done 
here is to examine the constitution and historic texts of the democratic state so 
as to distil the fundamental ideas from the political traditions. For example, 
Rawls could have looked at the Bill of Rights and talk about how the articles in 
the Bill of Rights are undergirded by certain fundamental ideas he assumes. The 
same can be done for every other monumental court judgment, political text and 
constitution of the democratic state. Rawls however, did nothing like this in 
Political Liberalism and his later works which elaborate upon Political 
Liberalism. This is a problem because Rawls takes himself to be contributing to 
the public political discourse of the democratic society he inhabits. In that case, 
what Rawls should have done is to go through the key political documents and 
judgments in the United States (for e.g. the Constitution, Declaration of 
Independence, key Supreme Court judgments) and show how the fundamental 
ideas he assumes are accurate interpretations of America’s public political 
tradition. 
                                                          
51 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 25. 
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Rawls, on my reading, does not take this route to justify why he thinks the set 
of fundamental ideas is an accurate reflection of the public political culture of 
the United States. Had he decided to do so, he would have written a very 
different book with chapters devoted to surveys of the American society. 
However, what Rawls provided in his essay was simply a list and elaborations 
of what he thinks are the fundamental ideas of the public political culture. An 
explanation of how these ideas were derived was lacking in his account.52 This 
brings me to the second method in which one can justify the choice and 
interpretation of the fundamental ideas, and I believe that this is the method 
employed by Rawls in “Political Liberalism” 
This second way is simply to choose the ideas that are part of the political 
tradition of the society and interpret them such that they are the most reasonable, 
such that these ideas can be readily accepted by other citizens in the democratic 
state. More specifically, the choice and interpretation of the fundamental ideas 
are to be justified by how the political conception of justice that is yielded by 
these fundamental ideas coheres with the rest of our considered judgments.53 In 
Rawls’s own words: 
“Such an idea can be fully justified (if at all) only by the conception of political 
justice to which it eventually leads when worked out, and by how well that 
conception coheres with our considered convictions of political justice at all 
                                                          
52 In any case, while it is possible for the fundamental ideas of the public political culture to 
be derived from the sociological method, it is also possible, and I believe much more 
plausible, that (i) there will be a null-set, or (ii) the ideas will resemble nothing like the list 
provided by Rawls.  
See: George Klosko, "Political Constructivism in Rawls's Political Liberalism," The American 
Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (1997). 
53 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 26. 
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levels of generality in what we may call wide (and general) reflective 
equilibrium”54  
Call this the interpretive method. If the sociological method is to be 
characterized by empirical studies and surveys of the political tradition, the 
interpretive method is characterized by giving a favoured interpretation on top 
of the political tradition. This means that the interpretive method is not a direct 
contrast to the sociological method. Rather, there is a layer of interpretation 
offered by Rawls on what he perceives to be the public tradition, and the 
fundamental ideas Rawls invokes are what he thinks are the best interpretation 
of the American political tradition. Hence, the interpretative method that Rawls 
employs in Political Liberalism is not wholly divorced from political reality 
(like most ideal theories), but based on his interpretation of ideas that are latent 
in American public political discourse. My view that Rawls is using the 
interpretive method also meshes well with Rawls’s own proclamation that the 
task of political philosophy (and his book) is to help people orientate themselves 
and calm their frustrations against the political system they find themselves in. 
It is telling that Rawls uses the word ‘contribute to’ (rather than just articulate 
shared notions about) “how a people think of their political and social 
institutions as a whole, and their basic aims and purposes as a society with a 
history”.55 
There are two problems with providing support for the fundamental ideas of the 
public political culture in this manner. First, it is unclear how Rawls can sidestep 
the aforementioned problem, that of providing justification for the fundamental 
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ideas, without the use of antecedent moral principles if he undertakes the 
interpretive method. As Rawls acknowledged in one of the quotes above, there 
can be various interpretations of the public political culture that one can possibly 
take. With neither an examination of the public political culture in the real world 
nor an antecedent moral principle, the appeal to a specific set of ideas in the 
public political culture seems arbitrary. 
This brings me to a related worry with regards to the appeal to the public 
political culture, even if we grant that it is possible to justify the choice of a 
certain set of ideas without invoking moral theory. It is not just the case that we 
have to justify choosing one set of principles or interpretation over another. The 
very question of whether the public political culture is worth preserving is also 
a question that demands answer.  
Rawls’s method in Political Liberalism has been termed as a “strategy of 
avoidance” by Kok-Chor Tan. Rawls has simply postponed his justification 
rather than providing a sound basis for the fundamental ideas he invokes. 
Political liberalism, according to Tan, has to explain why we invoke certain 
ideas from the public political culture rather than others. It also has to show why 
it is the case that the public political culture is worth preserving.56 Raymond 
Geuss, echoing Tan’s concerns,  cautioned against using these shared societal 
convictions as fixed points, as these supposed shared convictions might simply 
be the product of ideological structures that need to be further scrutinized.57 We 
should take a leaf out of Karl Marx’s book here, and exercise caution against 
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appeal to ideas that are intuitive and widely shared. What we invoke as 
fundamental ideas within a political culture might very well be ideologies of a 
privileged class that seek to bind us to a particular mode of exploitative 
existence. In short, the “values of democratic citizenship themselves can come 
under attack, and these challenges need to be confronted” rather than avoided.58 
At this point, we have to seek justification for seeing citizens as free and equal 
persons (one of the fundamental ideas that Rawls assumes) rather than to 
assume that they can be justified with reference to their originating from the 
public political culture. 
The worries advanced above extend itself to the liberal principle of legitimacy 
was advanced by Rawls. Recall that the liberal principle of legitimacy states 
that 
“Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”59 
A government is therefore legitimate if its wielding of political power can be 
endorsed by reasonable citizens. The acceptance of this principle is supposed to 
guide our assessment of states and governments, and is integral in Rawls’s 
political liberalism, in the sense that it rules out  government actions based on 
theories of justice that are in turn based on comprehensive doctrines.  
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We have to note here however, that despite the importance of the principle in 
circumscribing the kind of theories that are legitimate, Rawls did not really offer 
a justification for the liberal principle of legitimacy in his writings. Readers are 
therefore left to ponder for themselves if the liberal principle of legitimacy is 
indeed the correct principle to use to assess the legitimacy of state institutions. 
Likewise, is the fact of oppression really undesirable if the oppression is a 
necessary mean towards helping citizens lead flourishing lives? Of course, it 
might be unfair to level this criticism at Rawls – Rawls takes himself to be 
addressing citizens of a society that is already committed to liberalism. 60 
However, our criticism does not depend on there being other sound non-liberal 
principles of legitimacy. As we will see in a moment, there exist other liberal 
theories of legitimacy that does not see reasonable endorsement as a necessary 
condition for legitimacy. For example, Joseph Raz argues that a state is 
legitimate in so far as the 
“alleged subject is likely to better comply with the reasons which apply to him 
(other than the alleged authoritative directive) if he accepts the directives of the 
alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than 
by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly”61 
The point of raising Raz’s theory of legitimacy does not, and is not meant to 
show that Rawls’s principle of legitimacy is false. Rather, it is to point towards 
the fact that further argument has to be made before one endorses a particular 
principle of legitimacy. This is particularly important for Rawls, given that it is 
the endorsement of the principle of liberal legitimacy that motivates the move 
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from comprehensive theories of justice towards a political conception that is 
justified via views that are implicit in the public political culture. Given that the 
principle of liberal legitimacy justifies key moves within Rawls’s theory, and 
also that it is an open question whether the principle of liberal legitimacy is 
indeed the correct view, the principle of liberal legitimacy stands in need of 
justification. 
While Rawls is silent on the subject, we have to try and see how the principle 
of liberal legitimacy can be justified within Rawls’s framework. Recall that the 
constituency that the principle applies to is citizens in a well-ordered society, 
and that these citizens are seen as free and equal individuals. The idea of free 
and equal are moralized notions that are found within the public political culture. 
Thus, we can see the chain of justification as such: 
We are committed to the liberal principle of legitimacy because we are 
committed to seeing fellow citizens as free and equal persons whom we owe 
justification to. We are then committed to the idea of free and moral persons 
because this is an idea that is implicit in the public political culture. It seems 
then, that the principle of liberal legitimacy, is justified with reference to ideas 
found within the public political culture. 
But this chain of justification is problematic, because we have seen in premise 
6 in Rawls’s argument above that the appeal to the public political culture is 
itself justified with reference to the liberal principle of legitimacy. This means 
that the justification of the principle of liberal legitimacy is viciously circular. 
And this poses a dilemma for Rawlsians who seek to justify liberal theory based 
on the public political culture: either they demand allegiance to the principle of 
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liberal legitimacy without justification (and depend on its intuitive appeal over 
other principles of legitimacy), or they employ a question begging justification 
for the principle by appealing to the public political culture. I argue that 
dilemma can only be avoided if we eschew the employment of the public 
political culture in political liberalism. The foundations of political liberalism 
and state neutrality has to be a well-elaborated account of (political) morality. 
There is a further problem in the use of the public political culture.  Recall that 
Rawls believes that his assumptions about the fundamental ideas of the public 
political culture are justified if the political conception of justice yielded by the 
fundamental ideas coheres well with the rest of our considered judgments. Also 
recall that stability is guaranteed by the existence of an overlapping consensus 
of comprehensive doctrines on the political conception of justice. I argue that 
the afore-mentioned views take us further from the justification for the use of 
the public political culture itself. If all it takes for a set of principles to be 
justified is for the principles to cohere well with our considered convictions, 
then all we need is a conception of justice/morality, comprehensive, ethical or 
otherwise, that is able to achieve that goal. There is no need to set our focus 
only on a democratic society, and make questionable assumptions about the 
fundamental idea of the society for a conception of justice to be accepted. And 
if I am right on this count, it also means that we can go straight to theorizing 
about political morality without making questionable assumptions about the 
public political culture, and more importantly, without reference to the public 
political culture at all.  
This has important implications for theory building in political philosophy: it 
means that theorizing based on moral principles still has a place in political 
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philosophy. What we need to do is to make sure that the political prescriptions 
of our theory, when extracted from the comprehensive doctrine, are the subject 
of an overlapping consensus of the other comprehensive doctrines (conceptions 
of the good) in the society. To sum up the lessons from the criticisms that have 
been fielded in this section, a plausible political theory on legitimate state action 
has to: 
(1) Provide a justification for the principle of legitimacy employed 
(2) The justification given for in (1) has to be irresistible (or in Rawls’s words, 
be subject to an overlapping consensus and coheres well with our considered 
convictions). 
Satisfying the two conditions will also satisfy the afore-mentioned requirement 
of having to meet the argument from asymmetry. I will provide such a theory in 
the next chapter, and we will find that a theory which satisfies the above 
conditions does not entail state neutrality. Rather, it directs us towards a world 










Chapter 4: The fundamental requirement of justice 
Based on the conclusions of the last chapter, we are now directed to find 
a justification for the liberal principle of legitimacy. I will argue below that we 
are required by justice to respect the right of non-interference held by all end(s)-
seekers. This moral principle undergirds the liberal principle of legitimacy, and 
is a requirement of justice so long as we see ourselves as end(s)-seekers who 
care about the attainment of our ends. Once the justification for the liberal 
principle of legitimacy is given, I go on to argue that accepting the liberal 
principle of legitimacy does not rule out perfectionist state actions. While the 
liberal principle of legitimacy and the fundamental requirement of justice direct 
us towards neutrality between persons, we can still support moderately 
perfectionistic policies that are endorsed by the people within a perfectionistic 
community. Further, I will also give arguments about how the liberal principle 
of legitimacy directs us to look beyond the legitimacy of coercive actions within 
the context of a closed society. Taking a global view of political theorizing 
means that we transcend the debate between neutrality and perfectionism at the 
state level: state actions are legitimate so long as the state provides the 
background conditions necessary for the citizens to exercise their freedom to 
associate. We shall now turn to my argument for what I call the fundamental 
requirement of justice against unjustifiable coercion. 
4.1 The concept of justice62 
As mentioned, I will argue that we have a duty, mandated by justice, not 
to coerce another person unless a justification that accords with that person’s 
                                                          




reasons can be given to her. An analysis of the concept of justice is in order, and 
I begin by entertaining a popular view within academic philosophy. The view 
claims that justice entails a strong presumption towards equality. For example, 
Sen and Dworkin suggest that the discourse on justice is pervaded by sentiments 
of equality.63  
Taking this view seems to allow easy solutions to different issues in political 
theory. For example, while Charles Larmore argued that the idea of equal 
concern and respect for persons provides the moral foundation to state neutrality, 
he also admitted that there is no good justification for the idea (of equal concern 
and respect). If the likes of Sen and Dworkin are right, then Larmore may claim 
that the idea of equal concern and respect is itself a requirement of justice. 
While not necessarily disagreeing that there is a certain relationship between 
justice and equality, the concept of justice has to be clarified further to 
determine the true nature of equality that is required by justice. Thus, we begin 
here by examining the concept of justice. 
The formal definition of the concept of justice has commonly been said to be 
“giving each his due”.64 We can refine this definition by elaborating upon the 
idea of ‘due’ – being due something, y as a matter of justice means that y is a 
“rightful possession” and that “others are required morally to respect” that right 
to y. There is a further question to be asked – how does one come to be due 
                                                          
63 For Kymlicka’s treatment of Dworkin’s argument on ‘egalitarian plateau’, see 
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 5. 
For Sen, see: Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-Examined(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
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64John Kane, "Justice, Impartiality, and Equality: Why the Concept of Justice Does Not 
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something as a matter of justice? Here, we invoke Aristotle. Aristotle, in his 
account of justice, famously argued that the best flutes should be distributed to 
the best flute players. For our purposes here, we are not interested in Aristotle’s 
substantive conception of justice but the formal concept of justice in which his 
conception is embedded. In Aristotle’s concept of justice, for someone to be due 
y (e.g. the flute), there has to be an existence of an input x (e.g. merit in being 
able to play flutes well).65 For Aristotle, merit is a relevant desert-maker, and 
the possession of merit by an individual tips the scales of justice in favor of that 
individual in the distribution of certain resources. 
Integral to the concept of justice that I am explicating is the concept of 
equilibrium and proportionality.66 Whenever an input x is provided, the scales 
are tipped and justice is demanded in terms of the provision of a proportional 
amount of y in relation to the prior provision of x. The proportional provision of 
y restores the equilibrium, thereby ensuring justice. By extension, when 
someone is not accorded her due (i.e. y is absent or disproportional), we could 
rightly say that injustice has occurred because the scales have entered 
disequilibrium.  
Recall my claim that there is no a priori presumption of (strict) equality in the 
concept of justice. In the foregoing discussion, I have laid out the concept of 
justice in terms of proportional treatment in relation to an input. It is logically 
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coherent to apply this concept to a situation where there is only one person that 
could supply that input and justice here requires only that the due be 
proportional to the input supplied by that individual.67  Since it is logically 
possible to consider the application to a single person scenario, and given that 
the ideal of equality is a relational concept, one could then argue, on the 
examination of formal definition alone, that justice is a concept that has no a 
priori connection with strict equality. 
In that case, where and when does the concept of equality come into play? How 
could Sen have argued that almost all theories of justice are concerned with 
equality68 and that “equality of some type had been sought in each substantive 
theory by arguing for the primacy of some space in the respective actual ideas 
of justice”?69 
To answer this, we have to look at another aspect of equilibrium, one that is 
more pertinent to the argument that I am making. Rather than strict equality, I 
argue that what justice requires is equal treatment for equals. For the sake of 
illustration, assume that we have two persons, Andy and Bruce. Assume also 
that we are in agreement with Aristotle here that merit (or talent) is a relevant 
desert-maker. All else being equal, should Andy receive a flute, it will be unjust 
if Bruce does not receive a flute as well. Going back to the metaphor of the 
scales, the scales between Andy and Bruce are tipped when Andy, who is of an 
equal moral status as Bruce, is conferred a greater share of resources. However, 
if Andy is somehow more meritorious than Bruce, then it would have been 
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unjust to give both Andy and Bruce a flute each. This brings us to the next 
requirement of justice: justice requires persons with equal moral status and 
desert-maker to be treated equally. To consolidate what has been said about the 
concept of justice above: 
Justice requires giving what someone is due – the idea of equality is not present 
in this definition of the concept.  What justice requires, is the equal treatment 
for equally deserving entities. Following from the above: 
P1: If A is morally equivalent to, and has the same desert-makers as B, then if 
A is due X, then B is due X as well. 
I started by claiming that we have a right to non-interference. It is still not 
apparent how this right is derived from my analysis of the concept of justice 
alone. To connect the foregoing analysis to the right that I am going to argue 
for, we need to delve into a separate concept: that of an end(s)-seeker.  
4.2 End(s)-seekers70 
An end(s)-seeker is someone who is capable of setting ends and devising 
the means to attain those ends. All humans are, and upon introspection, see 
ourselves as, end(s)-seekers in this sense. This is true regardless of the ends that 
we do hold in reality. While it may be tempting to see an end as no different 
from an overall life-plan, I make no such assumption when I use the word in 
this essay. My usage of the word is deliberately inclusive. Ends can range from 
a specific conception of the good life, to a certain subjective desire (such as to 
count the blades of grass in a field). We have a variety of ends, and we have the 
                                                          
70 This argument here is made with inspiration and reference from Alan Gewirth’s argument 
for human rights based on the principle of generic consistency. For more information, see: 
Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).  
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intention that these ends are fulfilled. The inclusive notion of ends I describe 
here can be contrasted with the more restricted notions of humans as project 
pursuers (Lomasky)71, humans as rational revisers (autonomy liberals)72 or the 
idea of a basic human interest in living according to conscience (Kukathas).73 I 
believe that an inclusive view is preferable to the three views mentioned above 
for the fact that it comports better with how we see ourselves. Contra Lomasky, 
there certainly exist people who live from moment to moment without an 
inkling of how their life should pan out. The view put forth by the autonomy 
liberals are unduly restrictive as they exclude people who have different ideas 
of the good, e.g. hedonism. Kukathas’ view does better but can still be 
reasonably rejected by nihilists about morality. With that said, the views of the 
all of the groups mentioned above remain consistent with the inclusive notion 
of ends that I have put forth so far. More importantly, all of the views mentioned 
above (as well as other views undescribed) cannot function without also 
assuming that humans are end(s)-seekers. 
When an agent sets out to pursue and achieve a certain end, she must also desire 
the means to attain that end (assuming that she knows about the existence of 
such means). Suppose one of my ends is to be multi-millionaire. I need a 
multitude of things to attain this goal. I need either a job and/or investment 
opportunities that allows me to accumulate wealth. I also need spaces to be able 
to store my money at certain places, be it the bank, or in biscuit tins under my 
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bed. These are examples of means toward attaining my ends, and if I am serious 
about attaining the end of being a millionaire, I will also want some of those 
means to be available to me. These means are plural, i.e. there are often a myriad 
of means available for me to attain a given end. I also take it to be obvious that 
not all means are desired, and those which are desired are not desired on equal 
measure. 
On a meta-level though, one type of means is fundamental to the achievement 
of ends – that of freedom. For example, I may be a banker working in the central 
business district, or I may be a footballer working in a stadium or training 
complex. In order to accomplish these ends (of working as a banker or 
footballer), I require freedoms such as the freedom of movement (to travel to 
the workplace), and the freedom of association (to work for a certain employer). 
Such freedoms are necessary towards the fulfillment of those ends (and any ends 
we might happen to have). All end(s)-seekers who have ends therefore desire 
and require those freedoms to attain those ends. 
As already mentioned, one who pursues ends also desires the necessary means 
to that end. It follows then that end(s)-seekers also desire the freedoms that are 
fundamental to the achievement of their ends. Given that we exist in a world 
inhabited by other end(s)-seekers who are also pursuing their ends at the same 
time, the desire for freedom may not always be satisfied in the reality. This is 
due to the social nature of our existence. As each of us desire and act on the 
freedoms to pursue our ends, our freedom to act will invariably come into 
conflict with, and function as a constraint to the freedom of others. The same 
can be said of others’ exercise of freedom acting as a constraint on our own 
exercise of freedoms. As such, more than simply desiring the freedoms 
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necessary for the attainment of our ends, we have to demand that others not 
interfere with our freedoms.  For example, the banker may be stopped by 
another person on his way to his workplace. Or I may be assaulted by another 
person, injuring my fingers and depriving myself of the end to become a pianist. 
In order to secure the freedoms that are necessary to our ends, we demand that 
others not infringe upon those freedoms. That is, we demand an aegis of 
protection for our freedoms in the form of right, and the fact that we assert a 
right of non-interference establishes a corresponding duty on others to not 
interfere in our exercise of freedoms.   
One might be suspicious about the move from desiring and recognizing the 
necessity of the right to non-interference to asserting that we have a right to non-
interference. I believe that the work that Alan Gewirth has done on the subject 
is instructive, and let me re-formulate part of his argument for my purposes 
here.74 Let me first define the term assertion. By assertion, I do not simply mean 
informing others, or causing others to recognize. Rather, an assertion is defined 
here as a statement of (a factual) belief. As stated earlier, we move from (a) 
recognizing that non-interference is necessary, to (b) asserting that one has a 
right to non-interference. Let us explore the consequences of one’s denial that 
she has the right to non-interference. By denying the assertion, she is in effect 
accepting that it is permissible for others to interfere with her freedom, which 
also means accepting the fact that she may not have her freedom to pursue her 
ends. The problem with accepting this set of claims is that they contradict the 
very notion end(s)-seeking that end(s)-seekers are compelled to accept. Recall 
that end(s)-seekers already recognize the necessity of freedom for the pursuit of 
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ends, and that the pursuit of ends is what makes a being an end(s)-seeker. Hence, 
the acceptance that she may not have her freedom to pursue her ends is also an 
acceptance of the fact that there are times when she may not be an end(s)-seeker. 
Thus, an end(s)-seeker can only deny that she has the right to non-interference 
on pain of a contradiction. Do note that the right spoken of at this point is only 
prudential: the end(s)-seeker is claiming this right on prudential reasons alone. 
This right is infused with a moral force only after we reintroduce the concept of 
justice. 
Having clarified the move from desiring and recognition to assertion, I present 
the foregoing points in the following argument: 
P2: If we are end(s)-seekers, then we are people who intend to pursue and 
achieve certain ends. 
P3: Freedom is a means necessary for the fulfillment of our desired ends 
a) Actions are necessary to fulfill ends, and freedom is necessary for action 
P4: If we intend to pursue and achieve certain ends, then we must also desire 
freedoms necessary for the fulfillment of those ends, in so far as we recognize 
the necessity of freedom for the realization of our ends. 
P5: Our freedoms are vulnerable to the interference of others; we need the 
cooperation of others to make use of this freedom (to attain our ends) in a social 
world. 
P6: If we desire the freedoms for the fulfillment of our ends, while also 
recognizing its necessity, then we have to assert that others not interfere with 
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our freedoms, that is, we have to assert a right to non-interference. (P2, P3, P4, 
P5) 
C1: If we are end(s)-seekers, then we have to assert a right of non-interference. 
The first conclusion we have here is (deliberately) weak: it is stated in the form 
of a conditional. Such a view of freedom and agency is also consistent with 
different religious and ethical views of personhood. One can be a Christian, 
Muslim or a (psychological/ethical) hedonist – it still remains that freedoms of 
the sort described above are integral to fulfilling the ends they endorse. This 
also follows from the discussion on agency at the beginning of this section. As 
such, by assuming (rather plausibly) that we are indeed the kind of end(s)-
seekers that I have described, we get: 
P7: The view that we are end(s)-seekers is consistent with all conceptions of 
personhood; we are end(s)-seekers. 
C2: We have to assert a right of non-interference. (C1, P7) 
a) This means that other end(s)-seekers have a corresponding duty not to 
interfere in our lives. 
Once again, the proposition stated in C2 is still weaker than claims by natural 
rights theorists. C2 only states that we assert that other people respect our rights 
to non-interference. It does not make the supposition that we have any pre-social 
or pre-political (natural) rights. This means that we are still a step away from 
establishing the conclusion that we have a duty, mandated by justice, not to 
interfere in another person’s pursuit of her ends. This is where we connect the 




Recall the following claim, which flows out from the preceding analysis of the 
concept of justice: 
P1: If A is morally equivalent to B, then if A is due X, then B is due X as well. 
(Justice demands equal treatment for equals). 
Also, the propositions from P2 to C2 generate our assertion to the rights of non-
interference simply from the fact that we are end(s)-seekers. Hence: 
P8: The fact that we are end(s)-seekers is sufficient to generate our assertion to 
the rights of non-interference. 
What this means then, is that: 
P9: If we assert that we are have a right of non-interference based on our 
characteristic as an end(s)-seeker, then we must also recognize that other end(s)-
seekers have the same right to non-interference. (P1, P8) 
C3: Justice demands that all end(s)-seekers have the same right to non-
interference. (C2, P9) 
How then do we go from the right to non-interference to the liberal principle of 
legitimacy? I answer by riding on the back of consent-theorists before me: rights 
are not absolute, in the sense that they may be waived at the (expected) consent 
of the owner. Also, we may only expect that our interference would have been 
consented to by the interfered only because we think that our interference can 
be justified with reference to the beliefs that the interfered has. Take the 
following scenario for example: 
Suppose I have the right to act in whichever ways I want, and I know myself to 
be someone who is a poor drinker who becomes violent whenever I am drunk. 
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While I may love to drink, I have a higher preference not to incur any 
inconvenience to others in my drunken state. Thus, I waive my right to get drunk 
by giving others the right to stop me when I try to drink a third pint of beer. 
The idea of justification does not apply only in cases where one is under the 
influence of substances. One may justifiably stop another from crossing a 
broken bridge if one knows that the individual crossing the bridge holds a 
mistaken belief about the condition of the bridge, and has a higher preference 
to not incur any injury. In cases like these, a justification that may be verified 
based on that individual’s own reasons may be offered after the act of 
interference. 
It must be noted though, that this is all assuming that the individual in question 
does have the higher preference that the act of coercion fulfills. Also, we should 
have a strong presumption in favour of respecting the individual’s explicit 
beliefs in cases where the justification we offer runs contrary to the individual’s 
explicit wishes. Going back to the earlier bridge scenario, whether our stopping 
of the individual crossing the bridge is justified depends on him having the 
higher-order preference not to incur an injury. If the individual expresses the 
wish to die after we have saved her, we should no longer make the assumption 
that the individual has a higher preference not to incur any injuries. 
I hope to have provided a plausible account of how we may bridge the gap from 
the fundamental requirement of justice to the liberal principle of legitimacy: all 
end(s)-seekers have the same right to non-interference, and the right may only 
be overridden if justification that accords with that end(s)-seeker’s reasons can 
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be offered to her.75 Assuming that the demands of justice exert itself equally on 
both individuals and the state, and that coercion is necessarily an interference, 
it follows that the state has a similar obligation not to coerce citizens without 
adequate justification.76 Any coercion by the state that cannot be justified to its 
constituents is an illegitimate use of force. If true, the fundamental requirement 
of justice provides support for the liberal principle of legitimacy, and the 
neutrality theorists now have the support they need for the liberal principle of 
legitimacy. I believe that this principle represents the best way for us to resolve 
questions in moral and political philosophy, and I will say more about the appeal 
and implication of this theory in a later section. For now, I look to reply to three 
potential criticisms that may be raised against my argument. 
4.3 Possible criticisms 
4.3.1 Some people are not moral equals 
The argument above depends on the idea of justice, that equal treatment 
ought to be meted to equals. I am able to move from this idea of justice, to the 
conclusion that we ought to accord everyone equal rights, only if I make the 
additional assumption that we are all moral equals. Some might justify 
discrimination over others due to differences in birthright, sexual orientation or 
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skin colour. They argue that these differences are morally weighty in themselves, 
and certain individuals are due less (or more) due to their having those 
characteristics. For example, one might argue that it is just for someone of a 
lower caste to be accorded less rights than another from a higher caste. A slave-
owner in 19th century American south will argue that the blacks do not share the 
same moral status as the whites, and should not be accorded the same rights as 
white. A religious fundamentalist may insist that homosexuals should not be 
accorded the right to non-interference as they are sinners. 
As such, one might object to my argument by stating that this assumption is too 
thick to be accepted by everyone without controversy. I will first make a weaker, 
preliminary reply. This is not a criticism that can be made by liberals, which 
basically include almost all philosophers involved in this debate, for they 
themselves assume the moral equality of citizens. What about moral and ethical 
views which see certain groups of people as moral inferiors, and hence people 
who are not deserving of equal treatment? Will a reply to these people 
necessitate assumptions that are too thick and hence controversial? 
I argue not. End(s)-seekers will make a demand for their rights to be respected 
in so far as they care about the attainment of their ends. This demand is made in 
so long as one meets the threshold of ends-seeking, and such a view (based on 
our capacity as end(s)-seekers) is consistent with all ethical views: proponents 
of various ethical conceptions cannot deny the view of end(s)-seekers that has 
been illustrated above. Once the threshold of ends-seeking is met, the same kind 
of rights should be accorded to the other end(s)-seekers who meet that threshold. 
The rights are granted to beings qua their capacity as end(s)-seekers. The idea 
of equal basic rights therefore applies to all (end(s)-seekers). It is incumbent on 
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those proposing discriminatory treatment to provide justification for their point 
of view, and the justification has to remain consistent with whatever that has 
been mentioned so far. Some might choose fall back on their comprehensive 
doctrine to justify the unequal status between some end(s)-seekers. My 
(somewhat weak) reply is this: my argument is made up of plausible premises 
that is consistent with the widest range of ethical conceptions, while the 
justification for unequal status is not. In the absence of more compelling 
premises from the critics, I maintain that my argument is more appealing and 
convincing. 
4.3.2 Proving too much: non-interference from murder and rape? 
There is another criticism that can be made against my theory. It takes 
the form of a reductio ad absurdum, showing that my premises lead to some 
unpalatable conclusions. It was argued that everyone is to be accorded the right 
to non-interference that allows them to act in ways to achieve their ends. Does 
this mean that the rights have to be extended to individuals who have 
undesirable ends? If the conclusion that we should not interfere when the 
murderer is pursuing his ends by attempting to kill another person is entailed by 
my argument, then it seems like my theory is the wrong theory of morality. 
My response to this criticism is this: the idea of right does not entail the freedom 
to do anything one wishes, but the widest possible freedom consistent with the 
freedom of others. The devil here, is in the details – how may my account of the 
concept of justice, and of the fundamental requirement of justice lead us to 




For two moral equals x and y, if x deserves a right A, then y also deserves the 
right. Even a would-be murderer will demand the right of non-interference (so 
that he may attain his ends, one of which being to kill an innocent person). 
However, if he does demand the right of non-interference, the same right should 
apply to his would-be victims (or anyone else for that matter). This is, once 
again, what is demanded by justice. Justification acceptable to the victim ought 
to be given for the taking of life, at which point the taking of life is no longer 
deemed as murder (but euthanasia). This criticism therefore mistakes the 
demand for non-interference to achieve their ends, and demand that our ends be 
secured. Once the right to non-interference for all end(s)-seekers have been 
guaranteed, our pursuit of ends must not infringe upon the equal rights of others. 
This also means that not everyone’s (not just the would-be murderer) pursuit of 
ends will be successful, and that the burden of justification rests firmly on the 
shoulders of the murderer to offer a justification to the potential victim. In that 
case, the attempt at a reductio to undermine my argument is therefore 
unsuccessful.  
4.3.3 Why stop at right of non-interference? 
One might criticize P4 of the argument on grounds of it being too 
conservative: if end(s)-seekers truly wish for the achievement of their ends, why 
then should we stop at the necessary means that is freedom? Shouldn’t we 
further and demand the means that guarantee (or take us as close as possible 
towards) the attainment of our ends? I will make a short reply to this criticism, 
as well as a clarification to my argument. 
65 
 
The reason why end(s)-seekers assert the right to non-interference is that it is, I 
believe the only means that is necessary for the attainment of all possible ends. 
That much, I believe is clear. On the other hand, it is unclear if there are other 
means that share this characteristic. It gets even more difficult when we talk 
about guaranteeing that our ends are attained. I remain skeptical about the 
possibility of there being means that are able to secure the ends of all possible 
end(s)-seekers. I will however, grant the critics that a possible reformulation of 
P4 may look something like the following: 
R4: If we intend to pursue and achieve certain ends, then we must also desire 
the means that guarantee the fulfillment of our ends, failing which we must 
desire the freedoms necessary for the fulfillment of those ends, in so far as we 
recognize the necessity of freedom for the realization of our ends. 
Do note however, that given the skepticism about the existence of such means 
(that guarantees the attainment of all possible ends), this reformulation makes 
no real difference for my argument. 
At this point, I would like to clarify, and emphasize that I have no principled 
aversion to making room for the right to the means that guarantee the attainment 
of our ends within my argument. As mentioned, the exclusion is made due to 
my pessimism with regard to the identification of such means. I have however, 
no resistance to the idea that such means be incorporated within my theory 
should they be identified. In fact, if there may be a means (e.g. education) that 
is able to take all members within a community closer to the fulfillment of the 
ends they might have, then (as you will see later) the community may choose to 
guarantee this means for its members. Such a policy, as you would see later, is 
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consistent with the fundamental requirement of justice. With that, we move on 
to the implication of endorsing the fundamental requirement of justice in 
relation to the neutrality-perfectionism debate. 
4.4 Implications of the fundamental requirement of justice 
In this section, I first argue that the fundamental requirement of justice 
does not entail state neutrality. Moderate forms of perfectionism like the one 
argued by Joseph Chan may still fulfill the fundamental requirement of justice. 
With that said, it remains that many issues that are subjected to reasonable 
disagreement may still fall outside of the purview of the state.  
Second, and more importantly, the fundamental requirement of justice requires 
the freedom of movement and association. Once we fully understand the 
implications of endorsing the fundamental requirement of justice, we will come 
to see that justice requires free borders, and that perfectionist policies (even 
extreme ones) are legitimate as long as the citizens are allowed the freedom to 
move out of the communities they inhabit. The requirement that we respect the 
freedom of movement also provides support for open borders and speaks against 
closed society theorizing. Let us first go entertain the point that perfectionist 
policies are, in principle, consistent with the liberal principle of legitimacy. 
4.4.1 The liberal principle of legitimacy and the fundamental requirement of 
justice does not require prohibition of perfectionist policies 
It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that a moderate form of 
perfectionism is consistent with the concepts of ethical integrity and personal 
autonomy. In this section, I argue that the same can be said for the relationship 
between moderate perfectionism and the liberal principle of legitimacy. Contra 
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Rawls, endorsement of the liberal principle of legitimacy does not make all 
forms of perfectionist action illegitimate. Neutrality is indeed required, but the 
form of neutrality that is required does not rule out perfectionist policies. 
I will first explain the form of neutrality that is required by the liberal principle 
of legitimacy. Given that the fundamental requirement of justice directs us to 
respect the rights of moral equals, the proper subject of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy should be end(s)-seekers and citizens (a sub-set of end(s)-seekers), 
rather than the conceptions of good. Hence, what the liberal principle of 
legitimacy requires is neutrality with respect to citizens, rather than neutrality 
with respect to conceptions of the good. As Gaus suggests, it is odd to think that 
ethical doctrines are the proper subject of neutral treatment.77 There does not 
seem to be anything morally significant with ethical doctrines that commands 
our commitment to be neutral with respect to them. Neutralists think that state 
policies should not be justified on perfectionist grounds only because they want 
to be neutral to the citizens who hold those ethical theories. 
This distinction is essential. Holding this new conception of neutrality 
(neutrality with respect to persons) does not entail the rejection of all forms of 
perfectionist policies. When we are neutral with respect to citizens, we are 
interested in giving equal treatment to each citizen, and not to the specific 
doctrines that they endorse. Thus, when we say that we are neutral to A and B 
with respect to X, we do not treat A and B differently with respect to X. Suppose 
that, by X, we mean the conceptions of the good life. Acting neutrally between 
A and B regarding their conceptions of the good means that we do not privilege 
                                                          
77 Gerald Gaus, ed. The Moral Foundations of Liberal Neutrality, Contemporary Debates in 
Political Philosophy (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 5. 
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A’s conception over B, or B’s over A. What happens though, when A and B 
share a conception of the good? It does not matter whether this shared 
conception of the good is thinly or thickly defined. A and B may share the same 
comprehensive doctrine (both of them may be devout Christians for example), 
or they may share the more local ethical belief that higher education is always 
good for the lives of citizens. In such cases, being neutral to both A and B does 
not necessitate neutrality with regards to the good. That is, there is no need for 
us to have a blanket prohibition against perfectionistic legislations given that it 
is possible that the citizens may share certain perfectionistic beliefs. In such 
scenarios, neutrality of treatment between citizens does not give rise to anti-
perfectionism.78 
A Rawlsian might object: while it is in principle true that citizens may share 
conceptions of the good in a society, it is practically impossible in free societies 
or a world marked by reasonable pluralism. 
This is where Chan’s defense of (moderate) perfectionism enters.79 Chan makes 
the distinction between different types of conception of the good. A conception 
of the good may be comprehensive, but it may also be local. As defined by 
Rawls, a comprehensive conception of the good covers and informs actions in 
all spheres of one’s life. One example is religious doctrine that purports to give 
an account of the world’s creation, as well as a practical guide towards salvation. 
However, a conception of the good may also be local. Take the belief that 
education is an integral component of one’s flourishing for example. This local 
                                                          
78 Alan Patten, "Liberal Neutrality: A Reinterpretation and Defense," The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2012). 
79 Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism." 
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judgment only states the benefits that would be brought about with a higher 
education level without making claims about, or invoking religious or 
metaphysical truths. Chan rightly argues that moderate perfectionism, 
characterized by the kind of local judgments of the good exemplified above, is 
consistent with neutrality amongst citizens as the local judgments are usually 
more widely shared by the citizens. Bringing this back to the fundamental 
requirement of justice, we have the following argument: 
(P1) According to the fundamental requirement of justice (and the liberal 
principle of legitimacy), we cannot interfere or coerce someone without giving 
that person reasons that can be endorsed by her. 
(P2) The fundamental requirement of justice applies to both state and individual 
actions in the same way. 
(P3) State coercion is legitimate only when it can be justified to the people that 
the coercion applies to. 
(P4) Beliefs about moderately perfectionistic conceptions of the good are 
widely shared, and moderately perfectionistic policies may be justified to the 
people that the coercion applies to. 
C: State actions based on moderately perfectionistic reasons may be legitimate, 
i.e. there is no reason to think that perfectionistic policies are always 
illegitimate.80 
We can now identify a crucial condition that makes perfectionist state action 
consistent with the liberal principle of legitimacy from the foregoing discussion. 




Perfectionist policies must be made under considerations that are compatible 
with the conceptions of good that exists in a given society.81 This is what Alan 
Patten describes as the strategy of generic entanglement.82 Should the state 
decide to implement policies aimed at improving the lives of individuals in 
society, it should do so in a way that is (as far as possible) equally compatible 
with all conceptions of the good in society. For example, if a state were to 
publicly fund a mosque, it would have run afoul of this requirement as the policy 
may only be justified to one group of citizens. On the other hand, one can see 
how state provision of public health and safety might be equally consistent with 
the various conceptions of the good that exist in society. And moderate 
perfectionism, as we have seen above, fits the mould of the strategy of generic 
entanglement. 
4.4.2 The fundamental requirement of justice requires freedom of movement 
The points above are made with the assumption that we are 
philosophizing about the grounds of legitimacy in a closed society within the 
current state system. By closed society, I mean a society that has no immigrants 
(people who enter the society) or emigrants (people who exit society). I argue 
here that while the points made above are still salient within the context of a 
closed society, the fundamental requirement of justice and the liberal principle 
of legitimacy pushes us towards a more global view of political philosophy. 
More specifically, the distinction between perfectionism and state neutrality is 
no longer as important so long as the freedom of association and freedom of 
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movement are guaranteed. That is, members of communities or state who do 
not agree with the perfectionist policies of the state may move out of the state 
and associate with other groups (or create new groups) without the interference 
of others.83 
Why then should we move from theorizing for a closed society? First, a global 
view is what is required by the fundamental requirement of justice itself. The 
very mode of justification undertaken to support the fundamental requirement 
of justice lends itself well a global theory because it is applicable to all end(s)-
seekers, rather than just end(s)-seekers inhabiting a certain state. Recall that the 
demands of justice applies itself to all end(s)-seekers qua ends-seekers. The 
rights are asserted by, and granted to, end(s)-seekers. The obligations are owed 
to end(s)-seekers, and not to specific members of a community.  
Second, theories providing prescriptions for closed societies do not show an 
appreciation for the empirical realities today, thereby providing little practical 
import for the world. Not only does the focus on closed society make the theory 
practically irrelevant, but it might also produce the wrong political morality. I 
will begin with a brief examination of Rawls’s justification for theorizing for a 
closed society.  
Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, justifies closed society theorizing by referring to 
it as a method of abstraction. The method of abstraction has undeniable merits 
in philosophy. By removing unimportant variables from view, it allows us to 
simplify the case and identify the variables or conclusions that are truly 
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important. In Rawls’s view, we should first determine the principles of justice 
that apply to the basic structure of a closed society before considering how those 
principles may be extrapolated and applied to broader contexts, i.e. global 
justice.84 
However, the purported benefits of abstraction and the piecemeal approach 
espoused by Rawls does not seem to apply to closed society theorizing, 
especially when we are trying to explore the range of moral options available to 
us. In fact, theorizing with a closed society in mind obscures certain variables 
and hence options available to us, and therefore direct us towards sub-optimal 
moral and political principles. 
Philosophy Club. Let us take the following case for example. Take a university 
philosophy club to be the microcosm of a closed society. Student members are 
hand-picked by the faculty. There is a rule within the club that each student 
member has to pay a membership fee of $50 and monthly fees of $200. The fees 
paid are meant to fund the student journal, a fortnightly party, and weekly 
seminar events. All student members of the philosophy club are made to pay the 
$200, regardless of the number of activities they participate in. Members who 
do not pay the monthly fees are subjected to punishment: they will be humiliated 
in various ways, and shamed on the club website. Members however, do not 
have the choice to exit the club. 
Some may question if the monthly fee is too exorbitant, or question if the fees 
should be used to fund fortnightly parties.  Some might think that public 
humiliation is outrageous, and is unnecessary as a punitive measure against non-
                                                          
84 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 7. 
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payment. According to the liberal principle of legitimacy, it seems like the club 
does not have the authority to impose these requirements on the students unless 
those rules can be reasonably endorsed by the student members themselves. It 
also seems like the initial coercion by the faculty members is an act of force that 
is illegitimate. By considering the club as a closed community in the abstract, 
we are led to the set of judgments enumerated above. Following Chan, one 
might then go on to say that only rules that are moderately perfectionistic85 are 
legitimate in such a context.  
Such judgments however, are woefully inadequate. The assumption of a closed 
society deprives us of an essential feature of the world we inhabit. We do not 
live in a closed society (or a world where borders are closed). We do live in a 
state-system with borders that are clearly demarcated and heavily policed. 
However, the fact that the state borders are the way they are is not morally 
justified. They are simply the by-products of historical contingencies, the 
drawings of colonial administrators on a map. The assumption that societies 
(and borders) are closed is overly conservative, and serves merely to perpetuate 
the current global order demarcated by (arbitrary) state boundaries.  
Furthermore, with the flow of populations between states increasing by the day, 
the principles derived for closed societies can no longer address the concerns of 
the current world. And as already mentioned, it limits our moral imagination 
and funnels our attention on two inadequate options in the form of neutrality 
versus perfectionism.  
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Instead, I suggest that the consideration of an additional variable, the idea of 
movement, into the scenario above will allow us to get to the crux of the matter. 
Let us return to the earlier example regarding the philosophy club. Suppose now 
that the students can freely enter or exit the group, and also choose to associate 
with other like-minded individuals to form new groups/clubs. This crucial point, 
I believe, changes the way in which we judge the legitimacy of the rules that 
were imposed by the philosophy club. Existing members who do wish to pay 
the fees have a variety of options ahead of them. They may (i) choose to change 
the rules from within, (ii) stay within the club and endure the punishment, (iii) 
leave the club, or (iv) leave the club and find a new club with a different set of 
rules amenable to their interests. 
Options (iii) and (iv) were not available to the members in the first version of 
the philosophy club scenario, and the existence of options (iii) and (iv) plays a 
morally significant role in how we perceive the legitimacy of the club rules. 
Now that members can choose to exit the club, anyone who believes that she 
can get a better package (of benefits minus fees and punishment) elsewhere can 
now choose to leave the club for greener pastures. Members who choose to stay 
are people who surveyed their options and presumably prefer the current options 
to the other options that exist (or could potentially exist). The same may be said 
for new members who choose to enter the club. 
In this new scenario, we no longer deem the rules illegitimate. We may think 
that some of the rules and activities as silly, juvenile and unnecessary, but we 
do no more than forming these opinions and abstaining from participating in the 
club ourselves. We no longer see that the rules are a cause for moral concern, 
and that the members in the club have a legitimate grievance against the rest of 
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the club. What this shows is this: the liberal principle of legitimacy (and the 
fundamental requirement of justice) may still be satisfied by a perfectionist 
entity so long as it exists within a background condition where the freedom of 
entry, exit and association are respected. Assuming that those conditions are 
satisfied, the most extreme of perfectionistic policies may still be reasonably 
endorsed by the people upon whom the rules are supposed to apply to, for the 
people who choose to join a particular club (presumably) chose the club for its 
appeal over the other existing and potential alternatives. The same conclusions 
can then be made for perfectionist states/communities in the world. This claim 
is, of course, made with the assumption that there is no morally relevant 
different between the clubs in our hypothetical scenarios and the 
states/communities in the world. And with the above-mentioned points on how 
the state borders are arbitrary historical constructs with no intrinsic value, it 
seems plausible to suggest that the two (clubs and states/communities) are 
morally analogous.86 
4.4.3 The end state 
Suppose that I am right regarding the need to move from closed society to open 
border theorizing. The focus of political philosophy is therefore not one of 
deriving the ideal political society, but the ideal political world. I will now 
attempt to provide a sketch of this ideal world. 
                                                          
86 At this point, the perceiving reader might notice that I have included the notion of 
communities whenever I have mentioned the state in the preceding paragraph. This 
inclusion is deliberate, for the concept of state connotes the idea of a monopoly of coercive 
force over inhabitants within a cleanly demarcated border, while the concept of a 
community does not share that connotation. Members of a community may also participate 
in many different communities, and hold multiple overlapping identities. 
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Let us begin with the fundamental requirement of justice, i.e. the right of non-
interference. The ideal world is one where end(s)-seekers are morally obliged 
to respect the pursuit of ends of their fellow end(s)-seekers. As mentioned 
previously, this does not mean that social rules backed up by coercion may not 
be made. Social rules may still be enacted, and punishments applied, so long as 
the end(s)-seekers deem those rules as necessary, or productive, for the general 
endeavor of end-seeking. For example, traffic rules might conflict with the end 
of some end(s)-seekers who have a preference to drive on the right side of the 
road. However, end(s)-seekers within a community may still agree on a set rules 
that they deem are acceptable and conducive for the pursuit of ends that they 
deem more valuable. 
Of course, it is possible that certain members in the community may still be 
dissatisfied with the traffic rules (or other social rules) in the community. 
Sometimes, they adapt their ends to acquiesce with said rules. Other times, they 
may find it difficult to stay within the community – they find that adherence to 
the rules represents too much of a curtailment of their end(s). This is where the 
freedom of movement and association enters. For end(s)-seekers who find their 
present communities unbearable, they have, and may exercise the right to join 
or create another community of like-minded individuals.  
These communities may come in all shapes and sizes. Some are socialistic, with 
strict rules on the possession of private property. Some are religious, where 
members choose to live a life in accordance to the religious doctrine they 
subscribe to. Some are libertarian, where members are free to accumulate 
property and do what they see fit with the property without harming others. 
Some are even a mix of various permutations described (and undescribed) above. 
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For instance, a community may cater to people who believe strongly in 
Christianity as well as socialistic principles. In each of these communities, 
people may still be constrained by rules based on specific visions of the good. 
The socialist community sees value in positive freedom and equality. The 
religious, not surprisingly, see value in the religious piety. The libertarians 
believe in negative liberty. Contra state neutralists, the most important thing 
here is not whether the policies or practices of each community are 
perfectionistic. Rather, the important thing is whether the community is a 
voluntary association where the members see the rules as conducive means 
towards the attainment of their ends. 
In this vision, a plurality of ends are nested within a liberal order underpinned 
by the liberal principle of legitimacy, which is itself underpinned ultimately by 
the fundamental requirement of justice. Simply put, the fundamental 
requirement of justice requires a voluntarist, anarchist world order. 
An unrealistic utopia? 
One might point out that this vision is unrealistic, for the world is currently 
state-centric, and the state system does not seem to be crumbling any time soon. 
At this point, I wish to make a note about my theory. My theory is an exercise 
in ideal theory. That is, I make an attempt to find out the ideal political order 
that is not beholden to regrettable empirical realities (unless the reality in 
question can never be changed). This is similar to Rawls’s attempt to find a 
realistic utopia by probing the limits of practical possibilities.87 This is also why 
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I made the push for global theorizing in place of closed society theorizing, for I 
firmly believe that the vision laid out above is better than any alternative that 
describes a world populated by states. 
Furthermore, I do not pretend that my prescriptions here may be applied whole-
sale to non-ideal situations, i.e. today’s imperfect world. In non-ideal situations 
like the current world we live in that is structured under the state system, 
Rawls’s prescriptions may still remain instructive. If we are to restrict our 
analysis solely to states and closed societies, then it might very well be the case 
that Chan is right – states may only legislate laws that are moderately 
perfectionistic. Still, this does not mean that much of the status quo is justified. 
While education policies may still remain on the legislative table, issues like 
prostitution, pornography, use of certain drugs may be swept off it. 
We have now gone a full circle. The fundamental requirement of justice 
provides support for the liberal principle of legitimacy. The liberal principle of 
legitimacy stipulates that the state (or any authority) may not coerce its members 
unless the demands of the state may be reasonably endorsed by the members. 
And this stipulation points us towards a voluntarist, anarchist world order. 
4.5 Appeal of the theory 
In this last section, I will make a juxtaposition between my theory, and 
Rawls’s political liberalism to highlight the appeal of my theory. I will therefore 
start with a general critique of Rawls’ theory. Suppose that we concede that 
Rawls’s theory is sound. Rawls’s appeal to the public political culture curtails 
the ability of the theory to offer justification for liberalism to people who are 
not already committed to liberalism. As afore-mentioned, Rawls’s theory is 
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built on ideas that can be invoked from within the public political culture of a 
democratic society. By doing so, Rawls is limiting the audience of his political 
philosophy to citizens who inhabit a society where liberal values have deep 
roots. The key role of political philosophy, according to Rawls, is to “contribute 
to how people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, and their 
basic aims and purposes as a society with a history”88 and Rawls takes himself 
to be speaking only to people who are in the democratic tradition.  
What is troubling about this is that such a theory is unable to give any kind of 
justification to non-liberal societies as to why liberal institutions should be 
implemented in the first place. In abstaining from giving any moral reason for 
liberal principles and institutions, political liberalism is unable to give any form 
of support for liberalizing societies. This means that Rawls’s theory, in 
discarding ambitions for a more general justification for liberalism, has got little 
relevance in situations where justification of liberalism matters most. 
Rawlsians might answer my objection by stating that Rawls never had those 
aims (of providing justification for those outside the democratic state) in the 
first place. Justification, for Rawls, can only occur for people who share the 
same premises. Consider this excerpt from the Theory of Justice: 
“Ideally, to justify a conception of justice to someone is to give him a proof of 
its principles from premises that we both accept, these principles having in turn 
consequences that match our considered judgments… It is perfectly proper, then, 
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that the argument for principles of justice should proceed from some 
consensus.”89 
Thus, Rawlsians would be skeptical that the sort of ‘justification’ that I am 
speaking of is just confusion about the term ‘justification’. How can we hope to 
offer justifications to people who are not liberal, say the Rawlsians, if they do 
not share liberal premises? 
Suppose it is right that justification is about reasoning from shared premises. 
This does not mean that we should give up finding justifications (shared 
premises) for some of our moral convictions, or that those convictions can never 
be justified in the Rawlsian sense. Shouldn’t also some of the shared societal 
consensus be put to question, and shouldn’t we seek to convince people to 
change consensus with further arguments? Our job is not just to rationalize or 
show the implications of our public political culture, but to criticize political 
culture, “to change it for the better, and struggle against authoritarian 
regression.”90  
Having a brand of liberalism that is supported by a moral argument also allows 
us to give reasons as to why the liberal premises (i.e. the liberal principle of 
legitimacy) have to be accepted. Taking Rawls’s arguments for the fact of 
reasonable pluralism seriously does not obviate the need for moral theorizing 
from the foundations. While it is true that there will be adherents of different 
conceptions of the good with the free exercise of human reason, it should not be 
taken for granted that the people who endorse a particular conception will 
always endorse that conception throughout their entire life. Rawls himself 
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acknowledges that a rational a person has the ability to come to, as well as revise, 
her conception of the good throughout her life. In that case, political philosophy 
has a role to play to jostle for the allegiance of citizens. 
The considered judgments that serve as fixed points of the reflective equilibrium 
do not come into existence simply because people tend to converge on them. It 
could be true that the widespread adoption of those convictions lends greater 
credence to those convictions, but it is largely the appeal of the arguments for 
those convictions which make those convictions appealing. There are still 
arguments to be made either way to adopt or discard a certain judgment in the 
reflective equilibrium. In fact, Rawls himself concedes that “whenever someone 
insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamental to ensure their 
being rightly settled justifies civil strife, we may have to assert certain aspects 
of our comprehensive… doctrine”.91 We need to have certain resources within 
our grasp, resources that are well though-out and articulated such that it may 
have a possibility of convincing the other. In fact, and as I have shown, such 
resources (the moral foundations), need not be comprehensive. 
Likewise, moral theories that people hold on to may also change based on the 
arguments that have been put forth. Even if it is indeed the case that there will 
not be universal adoption of one moral doctrine, it could still be the case that 
persuasive arguments be made to sway people one way or the other. 
Dependence on the ideas simply because they are part of the public political 
culture is not the best that political philosophers can do. 
                                                          
91 John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal for Legal Studies 7, 
no. 1 (1987): 14. 
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Herein lies the appeal of my theory over Rawls’s political liberalism: Rawls’s 
appeal to the public political culture might make his theory internally consistent, 
but this internal consistency is bought at a high price. Rawls made explicit 
mention of how he is only addressing the citizens in a liberal democracy like 
the United States, citizens who, explicitly or implicitly, already share certain 
liberal norms. On the other hand, the grip of the fundamental requirement of 
justice is exerted on anyone who sees herself as an end(s)-seeker. This 
justification is not restricted solely to citizens in a liberal democracy, and this is 
important, for the world is more connected than ever. Immigration policies of a 
state have great (and often disastrous) effects on people living in other places. 
The same can be said for political perfectionism. Contemporary political 
perfectionists like Raz identify themselves as liberals, and often appeal to 
controversial values (e.g. autonomy) that other cultures do not share. Given the 
amount of interaction made citizens from different states and communities 
today, justification cannot be made with reference to thick values that cannot be 
justified to people from another culture. Thus, on top of satisfying the conditions 
set out in chapter two, my theory enjoys a wider justificatory base as compared 
to the existing perfectionist and neutralist counterparts, and is therefore more 
appealing in comparison to the existing theories within the literature. 
4.6 Closing Remarks 
I hope I have, in this essay, given a compelling account of the 
fundamental requirement of justice, and how it should change the way we view 
the debate on perfectionism and state neutrality. Interestingly (for me at least), 
I started this project due to my worry about the potential oppressive policies of 
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political perfectionism and the dissatisfaction regarding the current 
justifications for state neutrality. This led me to attempt at deriving a moral 
justification for state neutrality. As you would have seen, the project took on a 
life of its own. While I sought to supply the moral foundations for state 
neutrality, I turned away from current forms of state neutrality, causing the 
project to end up in its current shape. My hope here is that my conclusions in 
this essay will breathe life into more work on theorizing that does not make the 
assumption of a closed society, while also giving a more precise account of what 
freedom of association and movement entails. For example, some have 
suggested that states should provide education for the citizens so that they are 
better able to make the transition to new environments.92 Is this necessary? I do 
not pretend to have the answer to such questions, at least not in this essay. These 
are however, pertinent questions that I believe require greater attention if it is 
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